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The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy 
debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not 
limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
Funding to establish the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy has been provided by the Australian Government. 
 
The views expressed in the contributions to this Monitor are entirely the
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OVERVIEW 
MIKE CALLAGHAN1 
This issue of the Monitor contains a keynote speech delivered at a 
recent G20 Studies Centre conference on G20 accountability and 
effectiveness, along with papers on income inequality, energy 
governance reform and the G20’s anti-corruption agenda. 
 
KEYNOTE SPEECH: THE BRISBANE SUMMIT: A 
CRITICAL MOMENT FOR THE G20 LEADERS’ 
PROCESS 
On 25 June 2014, the Lowy Institute hosted a conference in Melbourne 
titled Strengthening the G20’s Accountability and Effectiveness. John 
Lipsky, former first deputy managing director at the IMF, provided the 
keynote address and the full text of his speech is reproduced in this 
issue of the Monitor. 
Lipsky highlights a number of positive attributes that Australia can bring 
to its role as chair of the G20 in 2014. He also provides “a potted 
summary” of the evolution of global economic governance and the role 
of the G20. Lipsky sees the outcome of the Brisbane Summit as a critical 
moment for the G20, arguing that the future effectiveness of the G20 will 
depend on whether the Brisbane Summit restores a sense of political 
momentum and concrete accomplishment to the G20 leaders’ process – 
a return to leadership displayed at the original leaders’ summits. He 
notes the task will be particularly challenging given rising geopolitical 
tensions. 
While Lipsky believes that the growth agenda should be at the core of 
the G20’s activities, he observes that the main problem impacting the 
effectiveness of the forum is that key G20 leaders have not conveyed to 
their own citizens that global policy cooperation is critical to improving 
their economic performance. As a result, it is hard to say with certainty 
that any G20 member has altered its policy plans in the interest of 
achieving greater policy coherence.  
Lipsky highlights the potential to promote global welfare gains at the 
Brisbane Summit that could re-energise the spirit of economic 
cooperation. But he also notes that the risk of failure could result in the 
G20 being viewed as terminally ineffective. In this latter situation, the 
concern is that the creation of the G20 leaders’ process would have 
                                                
1 Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
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downgraded the pre-existing network of key international institutions 
without having created a “compensating competency”.  
 
SHOULD THE G20 FOCUS ON INCOME AND WEALTH 
INEQUALITY? 
Geoff Weir’s paper addresses the topical question of whether the G20 
should focus on distributional issues or just on growth. He points out that 
this is a long-standing debate within the economics profession, with 
divided views as to whether the policy objectives should be on “growing 
the pie so that there is more for everyone” or “dividing it up before it is 
even baked”. As Weir outlines, at one stage there was a strong view in 
favour of emphasising growth and arguing that distributional issues will, 
in the process, largely take care of themselves. However the concept of 
all workers fully benefiting from economic growth has, as Weir notes, 
been “mugged” as better quality and longer-run data have become 
available. There is much evidence to suggest that income distribution in 
many Western economies has become more unequal. 
Weir focuses on the contribution of the work of Thomas Piketty to the 
issue of income and wealth inequality. Weir suggests that the major 
contribution of Piketty’s book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, is the 
framework he develops for looking at what is driving income and wealth 
inequality, in particular the role of inherited wealth. As to why 
governments should be concerned about inequality, Weir states that one 
of the strongest arguments is that growing inequality is inconsistent with 
the maintenance of an inclusive, democratic system of governance. As 
to policy responses, Weir notes that Piketty’s idea of a global, 
progressive tax on wealth is politically unrealistic. However, Weir sees 
the required policy response involving a combination of taxation policies 
focused on inherited wealth and income derived from it, greater equality 
of access to educational and health services, and greater transparency 
and debate concerning remuneration packages for senior executives. 
 
G20 AND ENERGY GOVERNANCE REFORM 
There are two papers on energy governance reform. Hugh Jorgensen’s 
paper contains reflections from a conference on Global Energy 
Governance and the G20, held in Shanghai over 28-29 May 2014, co-
hosted by the Lowy Institute, the Shanghai Institute for International 
Studies, the Korea Development Institute and the Centre for 
International Governance Innovation. The second paper is by Christian 
Downie and canvasses the G20’s prospects for driving reform of global 
energy governance. 
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Downie notes that the global energy sector is experiencing a 
transformation. Nations that were major energy importers only a few 
years ago are becoming exporters, exporters are becoming large 
consumers, and previously small consumers are now the prime source 
of global demand for oil and gas. However, as Jorgensen points out, no 
existing energy governance body brings together all of the major current 
or future energy players on an equal basis.  
In terms of who might provide leadership to help reform global energy 
governance arrangements, Downie outlines a variety of reasons why it is 
unlikely to come from the US, China or the larger BRICS forum. A key 
point highlighted by Downie is that there does not appear to be a clear 
preference or vision from these actors on the makeup of the multilateral 
energy architecture. Jorgensen notes that there is also not sufficient 
clarity on the objectives for any new governance architecture. In 2012, 
the then Chinese premier Wen Jiabao called for greater multilateral 
coordination between G20 economies on making the global energy 
market more “secure, stable and sustained”. But as Jorgensen 
observes, even just the initial task of establishing a common position on 
what a ‘secure, stable, and sustained’ global energy market actually 
looks like is complex and difficult, let alone taking on the challenge of 
sorting out how to get there. On a similar point, Downie notes that while 
there has been much discussion about the potential role of the G20 in 
reforming global energy governance, there is much less on what 
conditions need to be met for the G20 to act in a significant fashion. 
Downie comes to the rather stark conclusion that given the existing 
preferences of the US, China and the other BRICS, it is likely that 
substantive reform will require some form of crisis to shift behaviour. As 
Downie notes, major crises have the potential to transform the context in 
which G20 negotiations on energy can take place. Jorgensen observes 
that at the Shanghai conference, participants were divided on whether it 
would in fact take a crisis before the G20 moved to make a meaningful 
contribution to global energy governance. However, Jorgensen points 
out that there was at least general agreement that the G20 should move 
to pursue policies that promote ‘trust’ between G20 economies on 
energy governance. 
 
THE G20’S ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENDA 
Charles Sampford’s paper discusses the G20’s anti-corruption agenda, 
noting that the current focus is on lists of largely negative actions 
covering separate legal, institutional, economic, and ethical measures, 
rather than a coordinated multi-path strategy of mutually reinforcing 
measures. In particular, Sampford argues that rather than wholly 
focusing on what not to do, more attention needs to be directed at what 
should be the correct use of entrusted power. Specifically, he suggests 
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that the G20 should deal with the concept of ‘integrity’, that is, the use of 
power for publicly justified and officially endorsed purposes. He also 
points out that many of the problems the G20 confronts are not strictly a 
matter of corruption, but are interconnected with a lack of ethics and 
integrity, and suggests the need for a ‘Global Financial Integrity System’ 
to deal with the global financial crisis and a ‘Global Carbon Integrity 
System’ to move the world to global carbon control. 
As to what the G20 should do, Sampford advocates for leaders at the 
Brisbane Summit to emphasise the importance of promoting integrity as 
part of combating corruption, and to give the Anti-corruption Working 
Group a new impetus focused on taking a leadership and coordinating 
role in developing integrity and anti-corruption system assessments. 
…Sampford advocates 
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THE BRISBANE SUMMIT: A 
CRITICAL MOMENT FOR THE 
G20 LEADERS’ PROCESS 
JOHN LIPSKY1 
Note: On 25 June 2014, the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy hosted a conference at the Westin Hotel in 
Melbourne on ‘Strengthening the G20’s accountability and 
effectiveness’. The following is the prepared text of the keynote speech, 
delivered by John Lipsky.  
It is always a thrill to be back in Australia and to visit Melbourne after an 
absence of several years. I have been visiting this beautiful country for 
thirty years, and I always found it amazingly energising to be here. I’ve 
had the privilege of sailing in Sydney Harbour on Australia Day, deep 
sea fishing on the Gold Coast, attending a G20 Deputies meeting on the 
Sunshine Coast, and visiting Parliament House in Canberra.  
But on my flight here yesterday, I got to look down with envy as we 
crossed the West Coast at Port Hedland, and recall my youngest 
daughter’s tales of her three-month trek in the Kimberly Range, including 
encountering prehistoric rock art that might not have been seen for 
thousands of years and swimming with crocodiles. Happily, I only heard 
that part well after the fact. “Don’t worry”, she told me, “they were only 
‘freshies’, and you just had to let them know who was the boss”.  
I am grateful to the Lowy Institute for sponsoring today’s event, but also 
for the important work they have been doing to promote both the 
awareness of, and to enhance the preparations for the upcoming G20 
leaders’ summit. 
Today’s conference reflects the potential for new contributions of the 
G20, but also the critical need for renewed progress in Brisbane this 
November and that will be the principal topic of my address today. 
But I also want to acknowledge the many contributions of Mike 
Callaghan to the G20 process, and to his sustained dedication to the 
principle and practice of multilateral cooperation in economic and 
financial issues. He has provided talent, energy and dedication in this 
realm over a span of years without any expectation of fame or fortune. 
Through his many contributions, however, he earned the great respect of 
his international peers, and their appreciation for his accomplishments − 
first at the IMF, where he served as an Executive Director, when he 
                                                
1Senior Fellow, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns 
Hopkins University, Washington, DC. 
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served as Australia’s G20 Finance Deputy, and more recently, heading 
the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute. 
For many of us who follow these issues closely, much is expected of the 
Brisbane G20 Summit. In part, this reflects a traditional aspect of 
Australia’s international role: It is often said that Australia “punches 
above its weight” in international fora, and I have seen time and again 
that this is true.  
There are several possible explanations for this fact, none of them 
mutually exclusive. First and foremost, it reflects the quality of Australia’s 
civil service. When Australia is represented by officials of the calibre of 
Mike Callaghan, Martin Parkinson and now by Glenn Stevens and Barry 
Sterland − and by sherpas (who directly represent G20 political leaders 
at the working level) like Gordon de Brouwer and Heather Smith − they 
will be listened to, taken seriously, and viewed with respect, even by 
those representing much bigger countries. 
Australians are known to be plain-spoken and clear; they tend to “tell it 
like it is”. But in the specific case of the representatives I just mentioned, 
they tend to do so eloquently: More than once after Mike spoke in the 
G20, I would think, “Why couldn’t I have said it like that”. 
A second reason for Australia’s outsized influence is because of its 
recent history of sustained, strong economic performance. Like 
everywhere, there are near-term challenges, as well as issues that will 
need to be faced over the medium term. By comparison, however, 
Australia’s sustained economic success suggests that the authorities 
here tend to know what they’re doing − and that gives them international 
credibility that would be lacking otherwise. 
A third reason is Australia’s Asian location, providing a unique 
perspective on the most successful locus of global economic growth. 
A fourth reason − paradoxically − is Australia’s relatively small size in 
terms of population and GDP. No one doubts Australia’s sincere 
commitment to a multilateral approach to problem solving. Australians 
see clearly that global challenges require global solutions − and that 
means constant communication, cooperation, and compromise. 
However, the Brisbane Summit represents an important milestone in the 
development of the G20 leaders’ process for reasons other than respect 
for the abilities of Australia’s representatives creating optimism about 
what might be accomplished. In fact, many observers consider that the 
Brisbane Summit will set the direction of the G20 leaders’ process − 
whether on a constructive path or not − for many years to come. 
First of all, Brisbane will be the first G20 Summit to take place in Asia 
since the Seoul Summit in 2010. With Prime Minister Abbott having 
taken office only nine months ago, with new political leadership just 
taking office in India, with Indonesia’s elections only two weeks away − 
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and with relatively new governments in power in China, Japan and 
Korea, it will be important to gauge Asian G20 members’ commitment to 
maintaining the leaders’ process as the leading international venue for 
addressing economic and financial issues, a role claimed by the G20 
leaders at their first meeting in Washington in November 2008. It also will 
be important to gauge Asia’s new leaders’ willingness to work together in 
a cooperative fashion in order to address economic and financial issues 
at both a regional as well as a global scale. 
For now, the broadly cooperative attitude that dominated the 2008 
formation of the G20 leaders’ process in response to the global financial 
crisis has given way to a sense of much greater political tension than 
has been the case previously. The territorial and other disputes that 
have complicated relations within Asia are one factor. The crisis in 
Ukraine, including Russia’s contested annexation of Crimea, has 
heightened tensions sharply. Thus, the sanctions that several G20 
members have imposed on Russia represent a potentially serious 
complication to relations among G20 leaders. Finally, spreading 
instability in the Middle East has further undermined the atmosphere of 
cooperation, as well as diverting leaders’ attention away from strictly 
economic and financial issues.  
Reflecting these developments, a key question regarding the Brisbane 
Summit is whether the heightened geopolitical tensions are undermining 
the possibility of G20 cooperation on economic and financial issues. The 
answer isn’t necessarily obvious, as the underlying premise of the G20 
leaders’ agenda is that cooperation will produce benefits for all 
participants − a proverbial win/win outcome. Thus, to forgo progress in 
the G20 in principle implies forgoing the benefits of cooperation. 
Moreover, the Summit comes at a time when there remains widespread 
concern and/or dissatisfaction with global economic performance. 
While the first five G20 summits produced substantive agreements and 
new progress at both the technical and political level, the last three 
summits have been seen widely as having fallen short, each for different 
reasons. The 2011 Cannes Summit was more or less highjacked by the 
dramatic European political events regarding Greece and Italy that 
unfolded at that time. For reasons of the Mexican political calendar, the 
2012 Los Cabos Summit took place scant months after Cannes, and 
was marred by a public disagreement between the United States and 
the rest of the G20 regarding the issue of IMF funding. Last year’s St. 
Petersburg Summit clearly was hampered by political tensions that 
already were rising for several reasons between Russia and the G7 
countries. In addition, it was felt widely that the agenda over time had 
become overburdened with worthy issues, but ones that were not within 
the direct purview of the G20, that tended to dilute the focus of the 
summits, and that didn’t lead to clear conclusions or actionable results. 
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As a result, it will be critical for the future effectiveness of the G20 
leaders’ process that the Brisbane Summit more closely resembles the 
initial summits in terms of restoring a sense of political momentum and 
concrete accomplishment to the G20 leaders’ process. That will be a big 
task, but as I will explain to you in the course of my address, a new loss 
of G20 momentum and focus would raise substantial uncertainties about 
both the prospects for and the likely format of future multilateral 
approaches to economic and financial issues. 
In the balance of my address today, therefore, I would like to review with 
you the origin of the G20 leaders’ process and its relation to the pre-
existing institutional structures for dealing with economic and financial 
issues. Then I will discuss the G20’s principal agenda items, and the 
progress that has been made to date, and the key elements that could 
contribute to renewed progress, and the importance of achieving a 
positive outcome. Finally, I will examine briefly the risks that would result 
from a failure of the Brisbane Summit to create a sense of constructive 
momentum for the G20. 
So on to a highly summarised − not to say, potted − history of the G20 
leaders’ process, keeping in mind that the creation of this process 
represented the principal institutional response to the global financial 
crisis of 2008/09. In this context, it’s worth pausing for just a moment to 
recall the logic of the pre-existing international institutions, that were set 
up in the wake of the Great Depression and World War II, and that the 
creation of the G20 leaders’ process in effect sought to modify. 
In the late 1920s and 1930s, a recession turned into a Depression that 
became the Great Depression that sharply exacerbated the tensions that 
erupted in World War II. A consensus emerged in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s that the Great Depression became ‘great’ in large part 
because international trade collapsed under the weight of beggar-thy-
neighbour protectionist policies, exacerbated by the implosion of the 
international payments system, as an ill-fated attempt to resurrect the 
pre-World War I gold standard failed catastrophically. Ineffective and 
inappropriate monetary policy responses helped to spread financial 
panic, adding serious complications. The war, in turn, was hastened by 
the absence of an effective international venue for dealing with security 
and political issues, as the post-World War I formation of the League of 
Nations never gained traction, especially absent American participation. 
These specific concerns were addressed directly by the triad of new 
multilateral institutions created in the mid-1940s with the explicit goal of 
providing a solid foundation for a new rule-based world order based on 
multilateral cooperation. These included: (1) The United Nations, that 
was created to address political and security issues (abstracting from the 
many other activities carried out by various UN specialised agencies); 
(2) The General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, now the 
World Trade Organization [WTO]) tasked with progressively reducing the 
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trade barriers that had been erected in the Great Depression; and (3) 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), intended to create an open, non-
discriminatory and multilateral system of payments in support of growing 
international trade − at a time when the starting point essentially was 
exactly the opposite.  
The IMF’s sister organisation − the World Bank − was created at the 
same time, originally with the self-explanatory name of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The OECD − originally 
founded in 1948 as the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation to help administer the Marshall Plan − assumed its current 
form in 1961 and today comprises some 34 member countries. 
While it was intended originally that each of the three basic institutions 
would have global membership, the Soviet Union refused to join the IMF 
and the GATT − instead creating the ill-fated ruble bloc and the hapless 
[Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] COMECON trade area, while 
China and India were not yet major participants in global markets. Thus, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union − and the ongoing liberalisation of the 
Chinese economy (and to some degree that of India, as well) finally 
converted the IMF into a global institution as was envisioned initially, 
ushering in what I refer to as the period of ‘true globalisation’. In the case 
of the WTO, 24 countries are still negotiating membership.  
In this sense, the current international system is less than thirty years 
old, and still remains incomplete. It also should be remembered that 
strains emerged by the late 1960s in the IMF’s original fixed-but-flexible 
exchange rate system that eventually caused it to be abandoned in the 
early 1970s in favour of a non-system that my children probably would 
have entitled “Whatever”. These developments helped to give rise to 
regular meetings of the G7 Finance Ministers beginning in 1976, and to 
the creation within the IMF of the Interim Committee (now the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee, or IMFC), a ministerial-
level body that was created to help guide the evolution of the 
international financial system after the abandonment of fixed exchange 
rates. 
In other words, it long ago became evident that a rules-based multilateral 
system needed to evolve, and that this evolution required some kind of 
executive grouping in order to give the process form and substance. A 
cynic might say that this more fluid construction was based on the old 
notion that everyone is equal, but some are more equal than others. A 
pragmatist might retort that a global system that effectively constituted a 
permanent town hall debate might have its attractions, but more likely it 
would represent a recipe for stalemate and frustration. 
Now fast forward to the revolutionary developments of the 1990s, that I 
claim ushered in the current period of “true globalisation”. A global 
trading system for goods and most services has been restored for the 
first time since the onset of World War I. At the same time, the 
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international payments system became both global and dramatically 
more liberalised, liquid, and reliable than previously, while international 
capital markets emerged that had no historic precedent in terms of their 
depth, breadth and complexity.  
Not surprisingly, the post-1990 period has been marked by periodic 
bouts of instability − first the so-called Tequila Crisis of 1994-95, followed 
by the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997-98, and its aftermath. 
As I presume that you all remember, the G20 was created originally at 
the level of finance ministers and central bank governors in 1999, in the 
wake of the Asian crisis. The original proposal for the G20 ministerial 
came from Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin, and was supported 
strongly by the Clinton administration, among others. 
The basic idea was straightforward: the pre-existing G7 finance 
ministers’ process (intended to act as a leadership group) was too 
narrow in membership, and needed to be broadened if it were to be 
effective in a rapidly globalising world. That the membership was 
somewhat disjointed with regard to the IMF’s ministerial-level IMFC (but 
with a substantial overlap in key members) was not considered to be too 
worrisome, as the G20 ministerial was intended more as a talking shop 
than as a source of actionable policy decisions. At the same time, the 
Financial Stability Forum was created, with a membership of 12 financial 
centre countries, with the mandate to “promote international financial 
stability through information exchange and international cooperation in 
areas of financial supervision and surveillance”. 
Moving past the Asian crisis − and the nearly simultaneous bursting of 
the dot-com stock bubble in the United States − the opening decade of 
the twenty-first century initially was marked by a period of strong and 
uniform economic growth, but accompanied by unprecedented 
payments imbalances, with attention centred on the huge Chinese 
surplus and an even larger US deficit.  
The IMF responded to this challenging environment by convening the 
Multilateral Consultations on Global Imbalances of 2006-07, with the 
participation of China, the European Union, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the 
United States. Without burdening you with the details, this relatively 
unknown initiative was an innovative effort at multilateral economic policy 
cooperation that foundered ultimately on the lack of political commitment 
by the key participants to initiate the agreed actions that were intended 
to avoid the kind of crisis that emerged shortly thereafter. But the 
Consultations’ apparent ineffectiveness was taken by key authorities as 
ruling out the IMF as the principal organiser of broad macroeconomic 
and financial policy cooperation. 
When the global financial crisis began to spin out of control in 
September 2008 it was obvious that emergency action was required, 
and that the G7 was too narrow a grouping to be effective in organising 
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an effective response. Rapidly proliferating − and competing − plans for 
a new ‘G’ grouping eventually were settled by the decision to raise the 
G20 ministerial to the leaders’ level. 
On very short notice, the initial G20 leaders’ summit was convened in 
Washington in November 2008, where an agenda was agreed that 
focused on four principal goals: (1) restoring global growth; (2) repairing 
and reforming the global financial system; (3) preventing new trade 
protectionism while encouraging increased trade liberalisation; (4) 
reforming the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), especially the 
IMF’s funding and governance. 
In the subsequent London G20 Summit of April 2009, the Pittsburgh 
Summit of September 2009, the Toronto Summit of June 2010, and the 
Seoul Summit of November 2010, historic agreements were reached on 
actions with regard to each of these agenda items and, in each case, 
new organisations or specific programs were agreed in order to 
accomplish the key goals.  
In other words, it appeared initially as though the G20 leaders’ summits 
represented an effective format for international policy cooperation that 
could be viewed either as directing or supplementing (or better put, 
supporting) the actions of the pre-existing international institutions. In 
any case, a conscious decision was made not to construct a G20 
secretariat, in order to avoid the risk of simply adding another 
bureaucracy. Rather, the idea was that a rotating presidency would take 
the organisational lead, drawing on existing institutions and national 
governments for technical expertise and organisational support. 
Specifically, the initial post-Lehman global downturn was counteracted 
through unprecedented, simultaneous, massive, and pervasive 
monetary and fiscal stimulus measures. This was followed at the 
Pittsburgh Summit by the creation of the Framework for Strong, 
Sustainable and Balanced Growth in order to maintain a coherent and 
cooperative approach to setting demand management and other basic 
macroeconomic policies even as growth restarted. This work was to be 
carried out by the newly created Framework Working Group at the 
deputy minister/deputy governor level, with extensive technical support 
from international institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank and the 
OECD.  
In the interest of promoting the repair and reform of the financial system 
in an internationally consistent and coherent fashion, the G20 leaders 
mandated the expansion of the pre-existing Financial Stability Forum 
into the Financial Stability Board through the inclusion of all G20 
countries that previously had been excluded from the FSF. The FSB is a 
voluntary grouping of finance ministries, financial supervisors and central 
banks that was tasked with negotiating the intricacies of financial sector 
reform in the interest of enhancing international financial stability while 
promoting the availability of funding needed for restoring global growth. 
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Notably, this organisational expansion brought the authorities of key 
emerging economies to the ‘top table’ of discussion of financial sector 
reform. Ironically, the pre-existing Financial Stability Forum had been 
created less than a decade earlier explicitly in the interest of keeping 
exactly these ‘new members’ outside of such discussions! What a 
difference a decade can make! 
In order to avoid new protection, the G20 leaders pledged not to adopt 
any new protectionist measures, while at the same time agreeing to 
promote the rapid conclusion of the WTO’s multilateral Doha 
Development Round. And in the interest of IFI reform, the G20 leaders in 
London agreed on substantial new financial resources for the IMF and 
other IFIs, and endorsed innovative new IMF crisis-prevention facilities 
that responded to the characteristics of the increasingly securitised 
format of cross-border capital and investment flows. 
At the Seoul Summit in November 2010, the G20 leaders endorsed a 
major realignment in the voting shares and a doubling of the quota 
resources of the IMF, pledging to formally implement these reforms by 
the 2012 Annual Meetings. In a side arrangement, the IMF’s European 
members agreed to relinquish two of the eight IMF Executive Director 
positions (out of a total of 24) they held at that time, but only when the 
new reforms were ratified. 
In sum, the G20 leaders adopted in their initial meetings a substantive 
set of goals, and created mechanisms by which all of them could be 
accomplished. The sixth anniversary of the first G20 leaders’ summit is 
fast approaching. It is reasonable to ask whether any of the key goals 
can be viewed as having been accomplished, and whether the G20 
process has been meaningful in promoting their achievement. The 
answers will be crucial in deciding what is needed to be accomplished at 
Brisbane and beyond. 
At this point, it seems clear that none of the basic agenda items can be 
considered to have been completed. This is not in itself a condemnation 
of the G20’s effectiveness. After all, with the leaders representing close 
to two-thirds of the globe’s population, and nearly 85 per cent of its GDP, 
it already has been demonstrated that their agreement on specific action 
can be exceptionally powerful. At the same time, the grouping lacks the 
legitimacy of an international institution, lacks the legal standing of a 
treaty-based institution, and lacks a voting rule, meaning that its ability to 
act rests of the formation of a broad consensus. Moreover, the G20 
agenda appropriately contains only important and consequential issues, 
and none of them are susceptible to rapid resolution. 
Still, it is worthwhile to take stock of the progress on the initial agenda. 
Taking the four key items in order, the Framework Working Group 
(FWG) succeeded in creating a sense of substantive engagement on the 
broad issue of cooperation and coherence of macroeconomic policies. 
This reflects a sustained level of focused and substantive contact on 
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basic macroeconomic policy issues among the relevant technical-level 
officials of G20 countries that I believe to be unprecedented. It simply 
doesn’t work for a G20 deputy to refuse to engage with their peers on an 
issue of importance and expect to remain an accepted member of the 
group. Thus, a combination of persistence and relevance has produced 
engagement − no small accomplishment. 
This has occurred in spite of the almost total public ignorance of the 
specific work of the Framework Working Group, including on the part 
even of many normally well-informed specialists. A cursory examination 
of the policy action plans developed by the FWG as part of each 
summit’s documentation demonstrates that the FWG’s work has 
reflected a substantial effort at a technical level. Moreover, the FWG has 
developed an Accountability Assessment Framework − a peer review 
process by which each G20 member’s policy actions are to be examined 
in the interest of ascertaining whether the member has implemented the 
policy initiatives that had been indicated. The review process also 
addresses whether the plans remain appropriate, or whether they need 
to be revised going forward. However, reflecting the voluntary nature of 
the G20 structure, FWG members have been careful not to describe 
their Framework policy plans as ‘commitments’. 
Of course, one key reason for the lack of public awareness about the 
Framework is that there has been very limited public commitment at a 
political level to the process. Key G20 leaders typically have not 
portrayed to their own citizens that global policy cooperation is critical to 
improving their economies’ performance. Thus, despite the substantial 
effort that has been devoted to this process at a technical level, it is hard 
to say with certainty that any G20 member has altered its policy plans in 
the interest of achieving greater policy coherence − and therefore 
effectiveness − with its G20 partners. This despite the formal 
acknowledgment by the leaders at their Toronto Summit − supported by 
an IMF study commissioned for the occasion − that a cooperative 
approach to macroeconomic policy formulation can provide a Pareto-
superior outcome, in which everyone would be better off, and no one 
worse off, by implementing coherent policies relative to their pre-existing 
− and uncoordinated − policy plans. 
From my point of view, the lack of clear political commitment to the 
Framework from the most important G20 leaders is a significant issue for 
the future role of the G20. It should be remembered that the Framework 
for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth is the only one of the four 
key G20 agenda items that does not require cooperation or participation 
beyond the G20 members themselves. In that sense, it is the only 
agenda item that is entirely “Of the G20, by the G20 and for the G20”.  
Moreover, the goal of attaining strong, sustainable and balanced growth 
lies at the heart of the G20’s self-defined mandate of representing the 
leading venue for addressing economic and financial issues. In other 
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words, if the G20 can’t make the Framework an effective vehicle for 
policy cooperation, it has to be asked whether it can be relevant and 
effective in dealing with the other agenda items, that by definition involve 
the participation of non-G20 members. 
Perhaps the most concrete progress has been made on financial sector 
reform. An impressively rapid agreement was reached on the Basel III 
bank capital adequacy standards (although the risk-weighting approach 
on which it is based is a source of ongoing controversy). Moreover, 
important work on strengthening European banks is being undertaken 
this year. However, much work also remains to be accomplished on the 
regulation of non-bank financial institutions, and on such already agreed 
measures as the creation of central clearing mechanisms for 
standardised derivative contracts.  
At the same time, it should be recalled that financial sector reform isn’t 
synonymous with regulatory reform. In addition to improving regulation − 
and especially redrawing the perimeter of regulation to ensure that 
systemically important institutions were inside the regulatory perimeter − 
it was recognised that there is a need to strengthen supervisory 
functions, to create resolution mechanisms in order to limit too-big-to-fail 
risks, and to bolster the means of assessing progress in order to ensure 
that agreed reforms in fact are implemented as intended. 
With regard to trade goals, the picture is rather more uncertain. The 
WTO’s Doha Development Round has never been completed as 
envisioned. In its place, a raft of potentially important regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) are being negotiated, including the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), and Asian countries’ Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP). In fact, the WTO reports that at present, 585 RTAs 
either are in effect or are under negotiation. 
Finally − and most frustratingly − the IMF quota and voting reforms that 
were agreed at the Seoul Summit in 2010 − and which were to be 
ratified by October 2012 − have not taken effect for the simple reason 
that the United States Congress has not approved them. In all honesty, 
there is simply no clear prospect at this time for them to be approved in 
the current Congress, and there are serious doubts that the new 
Congress will be any more likely to do so. 
The panels that follow today will address specific challenges facing the 
G20 at Brisbane and beyond. What is required is to give the G20 new 
momentum and direction, not for its own sake, but because the G20 
represents the principal avenue for enhanced international policy 
cooperation, and because those who have worked to promote the G20 
are convinced − backed by analysis, as I noted earlier − that a 
cooperative approach can produce superior results, the always sought-
after win/win result. 
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What is required at the current juncture is a focused agenda − and the 
original agenda items in broad terms remain both relevant and 
unfinished, and I don’t need to repeat myself about the centrality of the 
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth to sustained 
G20 success − along with serious engagement at the technical level, 
and clear endorsement at the political level.  
It seems obvious that creating an atmosphere of coherence and 
consistency of purpose and policy would bolster confidence about the 
future that would be self-fulfilling, at least to some degree. Without any 
doubt, the willingness and ability of the G20 leaders to maintain their 
focus on economic and financial policy cooperation, despite the current 
political tensions, could even help to limit − and perhaps eventually help 
to solve − the current political tensions among some of the world’s most 
important economies. 
In the longer run, there will be a need to sort out the ambiguities of the 
current institutional structures for dealing with economic and financial 
issues. For example, the IMFC has the strengths of the legitimacy of 
universal representation and of a voting rule that allows acceptable 
decisions to be reached even in cases where there are disagreements. 
At the same time, there are substantial overlaps in the membership of 
the IMFC and of the G20 ministerial. Similarly for the IMF/World Bank 
Development Committee. The formal role of the FSB and its relationship 
to the IMF and World Bank needs to be clarified to enhance their 
effectiveness. The WTO would benefit if it were possible for the G20 to 
provide greater confidence in the coherence in efforts to further liberalise 
global trade in the face of proliferating regional trade agreements. And 
the governance of the IFIs will need to be adjusted dynamically over 
time. 
So the great incentive for pushing forward with the G20 leaders’ process 
is the potential for promoting widespread welfare gains in a confidence-
enhancing environment of cooperation. 
But we also shouldn’t ignore the risks of failure. The creation of the G20 
leaders’ process implicitly downgraded the relative standing of the pre-
existing network of key international institutions − as the G20 reserved 
for itself the role of providing the leading venue for addressing economic 
and financial issues. If the G20 comes to be viewed as terminally 
ineffective, the result will have been to undermine the pre-existing 
formal, treaty-based institutions, but without creating a compensating 
competency. The failure to achieve a win-win outcome runs the risk of 
instead resulting in lose-lose. 
Happily, our presence here today reflects our determination to do 
everything we can to make the result a win-win outcome. 
Thank you for your attention.
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SHOULD GOVERNMENTS BE 
FOCUSING MORE ON INCOME 
AND WEALTH INEQUALITY? 
GEOFF WEIR1  
INTRODUCTION 
One of the founding fathers of modern economics, David Ricardo, 
argued in the early nineteenth century that the distribution of national 
income between profits, wages and rents was “the principal problem of 
political economy”. In contrast, one of the towering figures of modern 
macroeconomics, Robert Lucas, argued in 2004: “Of the tendencies that 
are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion 
the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution.”2 
Who is right? Do equity issues matter? More specifically, should the G20 
policy agenda focus on distributional issues or just on growth? If both, 
why has there not been more focus to date on issues of inequality? And 
how should governments deal with the issue?  
This paper begins by examining these questions in the context of the 
role played by the economics profession. It then focuses on the 
important contribution from Thomas Piketty’s recent work, Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century, before considering appropriate policy responses.3 
 
TWO ARGUMENTS AS TO WHY INEQUALITY 
MATTERS 
Putting aside for the moment the ethical and moral dimensions to this 
question, important as they are, are there more pragmatic reasons as to 
why governments should pay more attention to income and wealth 
inequality? One of the strongest arguments in the affirmative is that 
growing inequality of wealth and income is inconsistent with the 
maintenance of an inclusive, democratic system of governance. 
Certainly that was the view of a US Supreme Court Justice, Louis 
Brandeis, who speaking early in the twentieth century said: “we may 
have democracy, or we may have great wealth concentrated in the 
                                                
1 Former Research Fellow at the Centre for International Finance and Regulation. 
2 Paul Krugman, “Why We're in a New Guilded Age,” The New York Review of Books, 8 
May 2014. 
3 Thomas Piketty and Arthur Goldhammer, Capital in the Twenty-First Century  
(Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014). 
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hands of a few, but we cannot have both.”4 This is a topical issue in 
Australia at present: would Clive Palmer have been able to ensure that 
the carbon tax, that would have hit his business interests, will be 
abolished retrospectively if he was not extremely wealthy?  
Another argument in the affirmative − which also challenges one of the 
‘stylised facts’ of economics, namely the alleged trade-off between 
equity and efficiency − is recent analysis that suggests this trade-off only 
exists for very extreme redistributions. In the absence of such extreme 
cases, an IMF study finds lower net inequality − that is, inequality after 
allowing for the impact of the tax/transfer system − is positively 
correlated with both the pace and durability of economic growth.5 The 
authors of the IMF study conclude: 
It would be a mistake to focus on growth and let inequality take 
care of itself, not only because inequality may be ethically 
undesirable but also because the resulting growth may be low 
and unsustainable.  
While this very important and policy relevant work is still in its early 
stages, the findings to date directly challenge the old political dividing line 
of “we’re focused on growing the pie so there’s more for everybody, 
while you lot are focused on dividing it up before it’s even baked”. 
Instead, the IMF note suggests that policy-makers focused primarily on 
how to boost domestic and global growth − as the G20 currently is − 
should be looking at inequality as part of this agenda.  
 
WHY HAS THERE NOT BEEN MORE POLITICAL 
FOCUS ON INEQUALITY IN G20 ECONOMIES? 
There are many reasons why distributional issues do not have a higher 
public policy profile in many countries. One is ideology or, to put it more 
crudely, self-interest: many of those who have reaped the benefits of 
economic growth are perhaps understandably reluctant to engage in 
discussions about whether the distribution of those benefits is ‘fair’ or 
‘reasonable’.  
Another, related factor concerns the way in which the economics 
discipline has evolved. Whereas in Ricardo’s time economics, or 
‘political economy’ as it was widely referred to, dealt front-on with the 
interaction between economic laws and principles and the political 
                                                
4 Robert Reich, “10 Practical Steps to Reverse Growing Inequality,” The Nation, 26 May 
2014. 
5 See for example Jonathon D. Ostry, Andrew Berg, and Charalambos G. Tsangarides, 
“IMF Discussion Note: Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth,” (Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund, 2014), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2014/sdn1402.pdf. 
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processes and social values through which these laws and principles are 
applied, much of modern academic economics limits itself to issues that 
can be expressed in elegant − but not always relevant – sets of 
equations and models. How do we model and measure ‘equity’ and 
‘fairness’? Neoclassical economists and their models of how economies 
work tell us that distributional issues can be largely left to the market to 
determine, since returns to factors of production − both at a macro and a 
micro level − will over time equal their marginal productivity, which is 
seen as both efficient (growth enhancing) and equitable in the sense that 
we are paid what we contribute.  
A third factor, and arguably the most important one, is that a good deal 
of modern macroeconomic analysis and associated economic policy 
advice to governments has been based on another ‘stylised fact’, namely 
that the wages share of national income in industrialised economies is 
remarkably stable. Keynes himself subscribed to this view: in 1939, he 
described it as “one of the best established regularities in all of economic 
science”, despite the fact that it was based on at best very inadequate 
data at the time.6 It is an assertion that is critical to broader issues 
surrounding inequality of income and wealth distribution: because the 
ownership of capital is much more concentrated than ownership of 
labour, a rising profit share is likely to be associated with growing 
inequality in the distribution of income, and vice versa. 
This assertion regarding the constancy of factor shares was taken a step 
further by Simon Kuznets, one of the founders of national income 
accounts, who in his 1954 address to the American Economic 
Association (of which he was President) put forward his famous 
“Kuznets Curve” theory. Labour’s share of national income, he alleged, 
at first falls (and with it inequality rises) during early stages of 
industrialisation, then rises (and inequality falls) and finally levels out and 
stabilises, as economies move into more advanced stages of industrial 
development and rising labour productivity is increasingly passed 
through to the workforce via higher real wages. In short, the view was 
that “a rising tide lifts all boats”. 
This view was seemingly supported by data suggesting that, for most of 
the earlier part of the twentieth century, the wages share in many 
Western economies did in fact rise and the profit share fell as those 
economies became more industrialised. It became a powerful political 
argument in favour of emphasising growth and suggesting that 
distributional issues will in the process largely take care of themselves. 
The argument reached new political heights under the Reagan 
administration in the United States in the form of ‘trickle down’ theory: 
that what is good for the wealthiest in society is ultimately also good for 
the poorest.  
                                                
6 Piketty and Goldhammer, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 220. 
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This ‘stylised fact’ of workers fully benefiting from the fruits of economic 
growth has, however, been challenged if not mugged more recently, as 
better quality and longer-run data have become available. To take but 
one of many examples, a 2011 ILO report found that the wages share of 
national income had fallen significantly in “three quarters of 69 
countries… for which data is available… from the early 1970s to late 
2000s”.7 These findings and their broader consequences have been 
confirmed in a wide range of other studies showing that income 
distribution in many Western economies has become considerably more 
unequal in recent decades.8 
 
ENTER PROFESSOR PIKETTY 
Landing in the middle of this inconvenient disturbance of conventional 
economic wisdom is Thomas Piketty’s major work, Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century.9 
The central empirical finding of Piketty’s book, based on long-run tax and 
other data sources on income and wealth distribution across a number of 
countries, is that the period from around 1910 to 1980, during which the 
distribution of income and wealth became considerably more equal, was 
the historical exception not the rule, that it has been partly reversed 
since, and that on current trends will be more than reversed over coming 
decades. 
Piketty attributes the compression of income and wealth distribution 
during this earlier period to a number of factors. First, the enormous 
destruction of wealth and the income derived from it flowing from two 
world wars and the global depression of the 1930s, which saw the 
capital share of national income fall from around 1910 to around 1950 in 
many countries. Second, is the historically much higher rate of economic 
growth in the immediate post-World War Two period (which he also sees 
as an anomaly). And third, the introduction of much higher and more 
progressive tax systems during the world wars to help finance the war 
effort. In turn, the partial reversal of this ‘historical anomaly’ period (a 
                                                
7 International Labour Organization and International Institute for Labour Studies, “World 
of Work Report 2011: Making Markets Work for Jobs,” (Geneva: International Labour 
Office, 2011), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publi
cation/wcms_166021.pdf. 
8 See for example Paul Sweeney, “An Inquiry into the Declining Labour Share of 
National Income and the Consequences for Economies and Societies. Presidential 
Address to the Royal Irish Academy” (2013); OECD, “Divided We Stand: Why Inequality 
Keeps Rising,” (Paris, December 2011); Reich, “10 Practical Steps to Reverse Growing 
Inequality.” 
9 Page references in this article are to the hardback version published by Belknap 
Press, 2014. 
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summary term I will use below for the period of falling inequality from 
around 1910 to around 1980) is attributed to the recreation of wealth 
since the end of the Second World War; to a marked increase in income 
inequality at the very top of the income scale (what he refers to as the 
“super managers”) in recent decades, especially in the US and UK; and 
to significant reductions in most Western economies in the 
progressiveness of their tax systems in recent decades.  
Arguably the major contribution of Piketty’s book is the framework he 
develops for looking at what is driving income and wealth inequality, and 
for analysing the critical relationship between the two. Piketty’s central 
thesis is that rising inequality largely reflects the fact that the average 
return on capital broadly defined, which he labels r, has exceeded the 
growth rate of the economy, g. Indeed, his data suggest that this has 
been true in just about every economy for as long as rough estimates of 
r and g can be made, except the ‘historical anomaly’ period.  
If r exceeds g by a sufficient amount, wealthier owners of capital are able 
to live very comfortably off just a proportion of the returns on their assets 
and reinvest some of those returns, leading − in the absence of a 
similarly sized reinvestment of labour income − to a rising share of 
capital in national income. It also enables owners of capital to pass on 
this growing wealth to their heirs, reinforcing and perpetuating the 
process and making it “almost inevitable that inherited wealth will 
dominate wealth amassed from a lifetime’s labour by a wide margin”.10  
This, Piketty argues, is exactly what the data suggest has happened 
historically. On his estimates, the return on capital has typically been 
around 4-5 per cent and well in excess of global growth, which he 
argues has over the very long run typically been around 1-1.5 per cent. 
Piketty sees the rise in the share of capital in GDP since around 1950, 
the slower growth since around 1970, and the fact that the ownership of 
capital is much more concentrated than the ownership of labour as the 
fundamental factors behind increased inequality of wealth and income. 
They are further exacerbated by the observation that returns on capital 
tend to be positively correlated with the size of the capital pool, and the 
very important impact of inheritance in perpetuating and increasing 
inequality. 
Turning his attention to prospects for the twenty-first century, Piketty 
argues that, in the absence of either some major geopolitical crisis or 
alternatively significant and coordinated redistributive policy 
interventions, the distribution of income and wealth is likely to return to, 
and then exceed, the extreme levels seen in the late nineteenth century, 
in what he refers to as “a drift toward oligarchy”.11 He sees two main 
                                                
10 Piketty and Goldhammer, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. 
11 Ibid., 14 
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reasons for this. First is his expectation that r will continue to exceed g, 
and by an amount sufficient enough to ensure that increased capital 
accumulation and inheritance will continue to play the critical role 
referred to earlier. Second, the increasing global ‘race to the bottom’ in 
terms of taxation rates on capital and progressivity of income tax scales.  
 
CRITIQUES OF PIKETTY’S ANALYSIS  
Piketty’s analysis has received an extraordinarily widespread response 
from eminent economists, journalists, and social commentators. While 
initially widely praised, it has more recently been subjected to a range of 
criticisms. None of them, however, appear significant enough to 
undermine his central findings.12  
Potentially the most damaging criticism to date of Piketty’s analysis 
concerns the reliability of the wealth inequality data he used. The 
economics editor of the Financial Times, Chris Giles, recently published 
a scathing article suggesting that Piketty had made “fat finger” errors, 
made unexplained adjustments to some of the data, included data 
entries with no source, engaged in “cherry picking” of his data sources, 
and made trends up for periods in which data were not available, such 
as in the US for the period 1870 to 1960.13 The clear implication of his 
criticism is that Piketty has “cooked” the data in order to reach the 
conclusions he wanted.  
However, close examination of Giles’ criticisms suggests that they are 
overblown. Even if one accepts all of his suggested data adjustments 
(which in his response Piketty certainly does not)14 most of Piketty’s 
central findings remain intact.15  
 
WHY ARE PIKETTY’S FINDINGS IMPORTANT FROM A 
POLICY PERSPECTIVE? 
There are two reasons why Piketty’s findings are critical to the debate on 
whether G20 (and other) governments should be focusing more on 
                                                
12 The author of this article has written an assessment of some of the main criticisms, 
which is available on request via weirgeoff@bigpond.com.  
13 See Chris Giles, “Data Problems with Capital in the 21st Century,” Financial Times, 
23 May 2014, http://blogs.ft.com/money-supply/2014/05/23/data-problems-with-capital-
in-the-21st-century/. 
14 See Thomas Piketty, “Supplementary Materials to Capital in the 21st Century,” Paris 
School of Economics, 2014, http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c2. 
15 The only case where this is not true is the UK, but here Giles' preference for an 
alternative, survey-based data source on wealth distribution is hard to justify given the 
unreliability of self-reported wealth surveys. 
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income and wealth inequality. The first is his conclusion that, in the 
absence of policy intervention, income and wealth inequality in many 
countries is set to return to the extreme levels seen in the nineteenth 
century, with all that implies for the health and stability of democracy and 
− in line with the earlier IMF work referred to − for the level and duration 
of growth itself. The second reason, which strongly reinforces such 
concerns, is Piketty’s analysis as to why this is occurring and whether it 
is justified: “the key issue is the justification of inequalities rather than the 
magnitude as such. That is why it is essential to analyse the structure of 
inequality”.16 
With respect to this ‘structure of inequality’, Piketty concludes from his 
detailed analysis of inherited wealth that: “the very high concentration of 
capital (wealth) is explained mainly by the importance of inherited wealth 
and its cumulative effects.”17 Similarly, with respect to the recent 
emergence in the US in particular of extreme inequality in the distribution 
of income from labour − “probably higher than in any other society at any 
time in the past” − Piketty argues this cannot possibly be explained or 
justified in terms of increased marginal productivity of the 
‘supermanagers’ earning it, and instead largely reflects the fact that 
social norms regarding extremely high remuneration have changed 
considerably in Anglo-Saxon countries, with supermanagers increasingly 
setting their own remuneration packages. 
Piketty then discusses the dangers of increased inequality for social 
stability and the future of democratic institutions, noting that: “our 
democratic societies rest on a meritocratic worldview, or at any rate a 
meritocratic hope … in which inequality is based more on merit and 
effort than on kinship and rents.”18 But if inequality continues to grow 
and is increasingly seen as dependent on “arbitrary contingencies” 
rather than merit, he suggests, the implications for stable democracies 
are obvious. It is hard to think of a more powerful case as to why rising 
inequality matters and why governments need to focus more on it. 
 
POLICY RESPONSES 
Piketty proposes two main policy solutions to growing inequality. First, a 
global progressive tax on wealth. Second, a more progressive personal 
income tax scale, especially on the very top income levels, where he 
                                                
16 Piketty and Goldhammer, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 264. 
17 Ibid., 246. 
18 Ibid., 422. 
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argues the ‘optimal’ tax rate in developed countries is probably above 80 
per cent.19 
Even if one agrees in principle that more progressive and coordinated 
income and wealth taxes are justified, they are also − as Piketty himself 
recognises − politically unrealistic. The reason for this is that, in a 
globalised world of highly mobile capital, competition to attract that 
capital is inevitable − or to put it another way, the chance of getting all 
countries to agree to higher and uniform tax rates on capital is close to 
negligible. Indeed, no doubt in part because increased wealth brings 
increased political influence, what we have actually witnessed in many 
Western countries in recent decades is much lower tax rates on capital 
than on labour.  
Piketty’s policy solutions also fail to show how highly progressive taxes 
on income and capital could distinguish between ‘socially acceptable’ or 
meritocratically based inequality and ‘unacceptable’ or ‘patrimonial’ 
inequality. Making such a distinction suggests there is a clearer case for 
higher levels of taxation on income earned solely on inherited wealth, 
and for progressive tax rates on inherited wealth itself. This view has 
been stated strongly on numerous occasions by, amongst others, 
Warren Buffett. In his 2007 Opening Statement to the US Senate 
Finance Committee, Buffett argued that: 
Dynastic wealth, the enemy of a meritocracy, is on the rise. 
Equality of opportunity has been on the decline. A progressive 
and meaningful estate tax is needed to curb the movement of a 
democracy toward a plutocracy.20 
Buffett’s testimony raises a broader issue regarding policy responses to 
rising inequality. It refers to “equality of opportunity” being on the decline. 
At least some − and possibly many − politicians would argue that 
governments should not be focusing on the ‘end result’, or ex poste 
distribution of income and wealth, but instead should focus on its ‘ex 
ante’ determinants, and in particular on how to provide for greater 
equality of opportunity with respect to factors such as access to 
education and health services. 
There is strong evidence that both good health and the completion of 
higher levels of education are major determinants of socioeconomic 
achievement at the lower and middle levels of the income distribution. 
Broader access to good-quality health and education, and improving 
educational retention rates among the more disadvantaged sectors of 
                                                
19 Ibid., 512. 
20 Warren Buffet, “Statement of Warren Buffett, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, 
Berkshire Hathaway, Omaha, NE,” in Committee on Finance United States Senate One 
Hundred Tenth Congress, first session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
2007). 
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society should certainly be an important area of focus for governments 
concerned about inequality and growth. That is why, as Piketty himself 
points out: “the issue of unequal access to higher education is 
increasingly a subject of debate in the United States”, where “the 
average income of the parents of Harvard students is currently about 
$US 450,000, which corresponds to the income of the top 2 per cent.”21 
Does Australia, with its recently announced higher education reforms, 
really want to go down this path as well? 
However, as critical as improving equality of opportunity is, the central 
finding of Piketty’s analysis is that the rapidly rising concentration of 
income and wealth at the very top of the distribution has very little to do 
with merit, ability, or effort and more to do with the ‘arbitrary 
contingencies’ of inherited wealth and of ‘supermanagers’ being paid 
extraordinarily large packages that have no relationship to their marginal 
productivity. As unwelcome as this finding may be, it does lead inevitably 
to the conclusion that changes to taxation policy, as it relates to inherited 
wealth, are a necessary component of policy changes to deal with the 
looming issues identified by Piketty. There is also a strong case for more 
transparency on, and open and informed questioning of, remuneration 
packages for senior managers. Here again governments have a role to 
play. 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Australia in its current role as Chair of the G20 has focused heavily on 
the objective of lifting G20 members’ economic growth. This paper has 
suggested that, even within this specific context, there is a strong case 
for focusing on inequality given evidence of its adverse impact on the 
level and duration of growth. 
From a policy perspective, the detailed and convincing analysis of 
Piketty suggests that the underlying factors driving increased 
concentration of income and wealth at the top of the distribution have 
very little to do with merit, and much more to do with inherited wealth and 
‘supermanagers’ being paid excessive packages set by their peers. 
Dealing with these issues will require a combination of: taxation policies 
focused in particular on inherited wealth and income derived from it; 
greater equality of access to good educational and health services; and 
greater transparency and debate concerning the remuneration packages 
paid to senior executives. 
 
                                                
21 Piketty and Goldhammer, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 485. 
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There is of course a ‘catch 22’ problem in all this. It is in part because 
increased wealth brings increased political influence that what we have 
actually witnessed in many Western countries in recent decades has 
been much lower tax rates on capital than on labour. It is difficult to see 
this trend reversing, even just with respect to inherited wealth, in the 
absence of either: a period of informed and open discussion of the 
issues, encouraged by governments and think tanks, followed by policy 
changes; or a major and disruptive social and political backlash at some 
point in the future. 
The unattractiveness of this second scenario is a further reason why 
governments need to put inequality issues firmly on their agendas.
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THE G20 AND ENERGY 
GOVERNANCE: FINDING THE 
GOLDEN THREAD 
HUGH JORGENSEN1 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper provides a reflection on the discussion from a recent 
conference titled Global Energy Governance and the G20, collectively 
hosted by the Lowy Institute for International Policy, the Shanghai 
Institute for International Studies (SIIS), the Korea Development Institute 
and the Centre for International Governance and Innovation.2 The 
conference took place at the SIIS over 28-29 May 2014. The paper also 
offers a few thoughts on where the G20 can most effectively provide a 
‘value-add’ to the global energy governance system. 
Although the G20 has, to date, attempted to address several energy-
related issues, such as ending inefficient fossil fuel subsidies (the 
Pittsburgh Summit in 2009), promoting clean energy investment (Seoul 
in 2010 and Mexico in 2012), and energy efficiency (2014), a dominant 
theme at the conference was that the G20 “has not adequately 
addressed the prior need for a revision of the global energy governance 
system itself.”3 A comparative advantage of the G20 as a global 
governance actor is its ability to mobilise political will for reform through 
the direct involvement of major leaders.4 Pushing for a revision of the 
global energy governance system, such that it more adequately reflects 
modern energy consumption and production dynamics, should become 
the ‘golden thread’ that drives the G20’s efforts on energy policy.5  
 
                                                
1 Research Associate in the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for International 
Policy. 
2 To see the full agenda and speaker list for the conference, 
visit: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/agenda_as_of_may_28-291.pdf. 
3 Hugh Jorgensen, “The G20 and the Global Energy Governance Gap: A Case for 
Leaders,” in G20 Monitor No.10: Infrastructure, Tax, Energy (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2014). 
4 Barry Carin and Domenico Lombardi, “Policy Recommendations” (paper presented at 
the Global Energy Governance and the G20, Shanghai Institute for International 
Studies, 28-29 May 2014); Dries Lesage, ibid. 
5 Mike Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen, “The G20 and the IEA: Plugging Energy 
Governance Gaps” (ibid.). 
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THE CONTEXT: THE MULTILATERAL ENERGY 
GOVERNANCE GAP 
In 2012, the then Chinese premier Wen Jiabao called for greater 
multilateral coordination between G20 economies on making the global 
energy market more “secure, stable, and sustained.”6 Wen’s comment 
points to a growing interest from China, and the G20 more broadly, on 
energy coordination, and particularly on how to make the global energy 
market more responsive to twenty-first century needs.7 The creation of 
the G20 Energy Sustainability Working Group (ESWG) in 2013 reflects 
this development. Yet establishing a common understanding between 
G20 members of what a ‘secure, stable, and sustained’ global energy 
market actually looks like, let alone on how to get there, is a complex 
and difficult task. It does not help that the current global energy 
governance architecture is “fragmented, byzantine, inflexible” and largely 
designed as a response to the energy challenges of the 1970s, and not 
those of 2014.8 
Moreover, the domestic energy policies of major economies leave much 
to be desired in terms of maximising globally efficient outcomes. Climate 
change is the most obvious and pressing energy policy-related 
externality. Even the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) ideal ‘450 
scenario’, where governments actually implement the requisite policies 
to stabilise the concentration of CO2 gases in the atmosphere to 450 
parts per million (ppm) by 2100, still only leaves the planet with an at 
best 50 per cent chance of not exceeding a 2˚C increase in average 
global temperatures by the end of this century. Of note, the 2˚C target 
demands a cap on additional carbon emissions up to 2050 of 565 
gigatons, whereas present fossil fuel reserves are estimated to be 
around 3000 gigatons.9  
And yet, in 2012, taxpayers worldwide footed a bill for US$544 billion in 
subsidies for the production and consumption of fossil fuels, with over 
half of this amount spent on oil products.10 To further highlight the 
inefficiency of this allocation of resources, one-quarter of the world’s 
population accounts for 90 per cent of global energy consumption, while 
1.3 billion people lack access to even basic electrical infrastructure, and 
                                                
6 Neil Hirst, “Paper for Session on "Global Governance and the G20"” (ibid.). 
7 He Xingqiang, “Policy Recommendations” (ibid.); Energy Research Institute National 
Development and Reform Commission and Grantham Institute for Climate Change, 
“Consultation Draft Report: Global Energy Governance Reform and China's 
Participation,” (February 2014), 
https://workspace.imperial.ac.uk/climatechange/Public/pdfs/Global%20Energy%20Gove
rnance%20Reform%20and%20China%27s%20Participation.pdf. 
8 Callaghan and Jorgensen, “The G20 and the IEA: Plugging Energy Governance 
Gaps.” 
9 Ann Florini, “Policy Recommendations,” (London, December 2012); IEA, World Energy 
Outlook 2013, (Paris, 2013). 
10 World Energy Outlook 2013. 
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2.6 billion people still rely upon burning traditional biomass for cooking.11 
Moreover, absent a significant increase in energy infrastructure 
investment in low-income countries, energy poverty is not predicted to 
disappear anytime soon, with the global population expected to increase 
from 7 billion in 2012 to 8.7 billion by 2035, pushing global CO2 
emissions to over 40 per cent above 2011 levels if current energy 
policies remain unchanged.12 
Yet as ‘diabolical’ a problem as climate change is, it is just one symptom 
of the major disruption that has occurred in the global energy market 
since the 1970s, and that has left the world with an increasingly archaic 
and inadequate global energy governance system. Christian Downie 
outlines several of these symptoms elsewhere in this Monitor, but suffice 
to say, demographic and technological change has fundamentally 
altered energy production and consumption in major markets, with 
former net exporters becoming importers and vice versa. New drilling 
techniques (such as fracking) mean net oil imports in the United States 
could potentially fall to zero by 2037, with China already in the process of 
surpassing the United States as the world’s largest oil importer.13 Large 
net exporters such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) are consuming more of their own resources, while energy 
supply and demand channels are also being disrupted by the entry of 
new smaller players into the global energy market.14 The continual 
advancements in solar technology further compound the disruptive 
forces building up in the system.15  
It is an anachronism, then, that no existing energy governance body 
brings together all of the current major or future energy players on an 
equal basis, such that it can adequately address these numerous 
challenges.16 This is not to belittle the work done by actors such as the 
IEA, OPEC, the International Energy Forum (IEF), the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), or the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), so much as to note that 
there is no single global institution presently equipped with the ability to 
                                                
11 Ibid.; Ann Florini, “Policy Recommendations” (paper presented at the Global Energy 
Governance and the G20, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 28-29 May 
2014).  
12 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013; Florini, “Policy Recommendations.”  
13 Ed Crooks and Lucy Hornby, “The New Gas Guzzler: China Has Overtaken the Us as 
the World's Top Oil Importer,” Financial Times, 9 October 2013. 
14 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013. 
15 IRENA Secretariat, “Renewable Power Generaiton Costs in 2012: An Overview,” 
(Bonn: IRENA, 2012), http://costing.irena.org/media/2769/Overview_Renewable-Power-
Generation-Costs-in-2012.pdf; Florini, “Policy Recommendations.” 
16 Neil Hirst, “Paper for Session on "Global Governance and the G20"” (ibid.); Thijs Van 
de Graaf, “Policy Recommendations” (ibid.); Mike Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen, “The 
G20 and the IEA: Plugging Energy Governance Gaps” (ibid.).  
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provide “strategic thinking about rules, cooperation or policy coordination 
for global energy.”17  
Given the IEA’s influential role as a collector and disseminator of global 
energy data through publications such as the World Energy Outlook, it is 
presently the most well-placed agency for taking on a more globally 
strategic role.18 Yet the IEA’s membership is only open to countries 
within the OECD, and thereby excludes members of OPEC, and also 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and South Africa. 
Although these latter countries have recently entered into an 
‘association’ with the IEA and have agreed to work more cooperatively 
on collating energy data, until the IEA abandons the ‘OECD-only’ criteria 
for full membership, non-OECD countries will have little incentive to 
meaningfully engage with the IEA as a policy coordination process.19 
Similarly, while the International Energy Forum (IEF) brings together 
energy ministers from 89 countries, including BRICS, IEA and OPEC 
members, it is at best a forum for “exchanging views and high level 
networking, rather than making policy”.20 The more issue-specific 
mandates of OPEC, IRENA and the UNFCCC naturally mean they do 
not qualify for taking on a more strategic ‘birds-eye view’ of the global 
energy system.21 
 
ENTER THE G20? 
The call from participants at the Shanghai conference for the G20 to take 
the lead in reforming global energy governance draws upon the same 
logic used in justifying the G20’s own elevation to a leader-level forum 
during the 2008 global financial crisis. Briefly, the clear redistribution of 
global wealth in the past decade meant the advanced G7 economies 
could not implement an adequate response to the financial crisis without 
support from, and consultation with, the major emerging economies. So 
too for energy – whereas the OECD/IEA countries once accounted for 
60 per cent of global energy consumption in 1973, their share by 2011 
                                                
17 Barry Carin, “Paper for Session on ‘Global Governance and the G20’” (ibid.); Zhu 
Song-Li, “Initial Ideas on Co-Efficiency of Global Climate and Energy Governance in 
G20” (ibid.). 
18 Neil Hirst, “Paper for Session on "Global Governance and the G20"” (ibid.); Mike 
Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen, “The G20 and the IEA: Plugging Energy Governance 
Gaps” (ibid.); He Xingqiang, “Policy Recommendations” (ibid.).  
19 Shi Xunpeng in particular believes expansion of the IEA to include developing 
countries is a completely unrealistic goal, see Shi Xunpeng, “Achieving Concerted 
National Actions: A Developing Countries Perspective on Global Energy Governance 
under G20” (ibid.); He Xingqiang, “Policy Recommendations” (ibid.). 
20 Neil Hirst, “Paper for Session on ‘Global Governance and the G20’” (ibid.). 
21 Zhu Song-Li, “Initial Ideas on Co-Efficiency of Global Climate and Energy 
Governance in G20” (ibid.). 
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had fallen to 40 per cent, and is expected to drop to approximately 30 
per cent by 2035.22 The G20 economies as a whole, however, are now 
responsible for three-quarters of global energy consumption (and almost 
80 per cent of fossil fuel CO2 emissions).
23 Given the redistribution of 
energy consumption patterns between G20 members is comparable to 
that which occurred in the global financial system over the past two 
decades, participants at the Shanghai conference were adamant that the 
G20 should not wait for a global energy crisis before it takes an active 
role in global energy governance reform.24  
Nevertheless, participants were divided on whether it would in fact take a 
crisis before the G20 moved to make a meaningful contribution to global 
energy governance. While some felt that substantive change would not 
come absent of a major disruption in the global energy market, a view 
echoed by Christian Downie in this Monitor, there was at least general 
agreement that the G20 should move to pursue policies that promote 
‘trust’ between G20 economies on energy governance.25  
Strengthening the level of trust between OECD economies and the 
major emerging economy energy producers and consumers − especially 
China − should, in principle, mean the major players would at least be 
more inclined to work together in an energy crisis, rather than revert to 
the kinds of unilateral or ‘rival-bloc’ behaviour that exacerbated oil crises 
in the 1970s. Still, energy governance reform is likely to be incremental 
in the absence of such a crisis, and the remainder of this paper looks at 
some of the recommendations made at the Shanghai conference as to 
how the G20 can best assist in pushing for a truly inclusive energy 
governance system, fit for the twenty-first century. 
 
THE FIRST STEP: DEVELOP A STRATEGY 
Should G20 leaders be able to agree on the need for a more responsive, 
inclusive, and relevant global energy governance system, they will need 
to develop a strategic work program that can facilitate such an outcome. 
Several possible methods for devising such a program were proposed in 
Shanghai, but they all broadly begin with the premise that the G20 
should be pushing to strengthen the work of other agencies, rather than 
assuming any formal responsibilities itself.26 At the very least, leaders 
                                                
22 IEA, “Key World Energy Statistics,” (Paris, 2013). 
23 Van de Graaf, “Policy Recommendations.” 
24 Ann Florini, ibid.; He Xingqiang, ibid. 
25 “Policy Recommendations”; Michael Levi, ibid.; Ken Koyama, ibid.; Yu Hongyuan, 
“Global Energy Governance and China-G20 Cooperation” (ibid.); Dries Lesage, “Policy 
Recommendations” (ibid.).  
26 Thijs Van de Graaf, ibid. 
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should draw upon the emerging momentum for greater energy 
cooperation by experimenting with a G20 energy ministerial stream 
under either the 2015 or 2016 G20 presidencies, naturally supported by 
the ESWG, possibly on the sidelines of the Clean Energy Ministerial 
process.27  
Whatever mechanism the G20 lands upon (if any) to design its future 
work program, it will need to outline clear objectives in the short term, 
and how these are connected to a long-term vision for the global energy 
system. Realistically, if the long-term goal is to have some kind of global 
and effective ‘energy steering committee’ that brings together the major 
energy players on equal terms, this is unlikely to happen overnight, let 
alone without the requisite political support and blessing of the G20 
governments. This will require a common understanding between G20 
members on what it actually means when it uses phrases such as the 
“global energy security agenda” − as found in the St Petersburg 
communiqué − lest the G20 simply end up pushing for institutional 
reform for its own sake.28  
Under Australia’s presidency, the ESWG has narrowed its focus down to 
energy market transparency, energy governance architecture, and 
energy efficiency, but absent of a clearly stated G20 position on how 
these agenda items fit into a long-term vision (and the broader G20 
agenda for that matter) the G20’s long-term contribution to energy 
governance may amount to little more than window-dressing.29 Broadly 
though, G20 economies have a clear interest in devising processes to 
assist in the future security of supply and access to energy markets, as 
well as promoting adequate investment in efficient energy 
infrastructure.30 Several papers submitted at the Shanghai conference 
also made a strong case for linking any future G20 work program on 
energy governance to the global sustainability agenda, particularly the 
post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals.31 Using these themes to 
                                                
27 The CEM already brings together energy ministers from 17 G20 economies on an 
annual basis, the only G20 non-participants being Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.  
28 G20, “G20 Leaders' Declaration, St Petersburg,” (6 September 2013), 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html; Xunpeng, “Achieving 
Concerted National Actions: A Developing Countries Perspective on Global Energy 
Governance under G20.” 
29 Australian G20 Presidency, “Energy Efficiency a Focus for the G20 Energy 
Sustainability Working Group,” February 2014, 
https://www.g20.org/news/energy_efficiency_focus_g20_energy_sustainability_working
_group. 
30 Carin and Lombardi, “Policy Recommendations; Yu Hongyuan, “Global Energy 
Governance and China-G20 Cooperation” (ibid.); He Xingqiang, “Policy 
Recommendations” (ibid.). 
31 Ann Florini, ibid.; Yu Hongyuan, “Global Energy Governance and China-G20 
Cooperation” (ibid.); Dries Lesage, “Policy Recommendations” (ibid.); Zhu Song-Li, 
“Initial Ideas on Co-Efficiency of Global Climate and Energy Governance in G20” (ibid.); 
Shi Xunpeng, “Achieving Concerted National Actions: A Developing Countries 
Perspective on Global Energy Governance under G20” (ibid.); Fuqiang Yang, 
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construct a coherent vision on what the G20 hopes to achieve for energy 
governance would also assist in determining which agency, or collective 
of agencies, the G20 should work with more closely in order to achieve 
its objectives. 
 
SECOND STEP: PROMOTE TRUST AND 
TRANSPARENCY  
If the G20 is able to establish a coherent vision on energy, it should then 
look to draw upon the work of existing energy governance actors and 
how they can best be brought together to “build trust, share information, 
exchange views and promote transparent markets.”32 While the 
possibility of devising a wholly new body should not be completely ruled 
out, as David Cameron’s report to the G20 in 2011 on governance 
reform states: “the solution in many cases is not formally changing 
mandates or creating new bodies … rather, institutions should be given 
clearer and stronger political direction to work together.”33 Accordingly, 
many participants in Shanghai identified technical assistance for, and the 
production of, high-quality statistics around energy production and 
consumption patterns as the most logical basis for the G20 countries to 
start strengthening trust with one another and in energy 
multilateralism.34  
In this regard, the relevant G20 members should move to provide 
requisite political and financial support for the IEA Association process, 
and joint IEF-OPEC-IEA initiatives, so as to promote “timely and 
comprehensive global and regional information on energy markets and 
investment.”35 A handful of participants doubted the likelihood of the 
‘association members’ ever becoming full and equal participants in the 
IEA, but the IEA’s premier role as a global collator and provider of 
energy data analysis was still seen as useful for developing a strong 
evidence-based approach for future energy cooperation.36  
                                                                                                       
“Recommendations for G20: Oil and Gas Market, Climate and Sustainability” (ibid.); 
Peter Saundry, “Policy Recommendations” (ibid.); Alfredo Sirkis, “Mechanism of Early 
and Further Action, "Currency Climate" and "Bretton Woods Low Carbon"” (ibid.). 
32 Barry Carin, “Global Energy Governance and the G20,” Centre for International 
Governance Innovation, 19 June 2014, http://www.cigionline.org/articles/global-energy-
governance-and-g20.  
33 Hirst, “Paper for Session on "Global Governance and the G20"; David Cameron, 
“Governance for Growth: Building Consensus for the Future,” (London, November 
2011). 
34 Hirst, “Paper for Session on "Global Governance and the G20"; Thijs Van de Graaf, 
“Policy Recommendations” (ibid.). 
35 Neil Hirst, ibid. 
36 For criticism of the prospects of the IEA Association process, see Barry Carin, “Paper 
for Session on ‘Global Governance and the G20’” (ibid.); Also see He, who notes the 
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Thus, while the IEA’s OECD-only membership prevents it from 
becoming a policy coordination centre for OECD and emerging 
economies in the present, the IEA’s attempts to provide technical 
support to the latter should nevertheless be supported.37 Efforts should 
also be made to bolster IEF-IEA-OPEC cooperation on the creation of 
‘energy outlook’ research, particularly in promoting market transparency 
through the Joint Organisations Data Initiative (JODI) that compiles 
global statistics on oil and gas. Such transparency measures will ideally 
help to “improve market efficiency, reduce harmful price volatility, and 
strengthen confidence in markets as an effective guarantor of energy 
security.”38 Stronger transparency should also prove useful in the quest 
to attract investment for high-quality energy infrastructure.  
A greater collaborative effort between the IEA and the major emerging 
economies over the management of emergency oil stocks constitutes 
another avenue for building trust. China and India in particular, as two of 
the world’s largest oil importers, are not presently part of the IEA’s 
emergency reserve mechanism, despite their major interest in ensuring 
stability of supply. The ‘Malacca dilemma’, identified by former Chinese 
president Hu Jintao, points to the concern the Chinese leadership has in 
preventing a sudden denial of access to the Malacca Straits, which 
accounts for up to 80 per cent of its total oil imports.39 Although all 
members of the IEA must agree to remain compliant with the strategic 
reserve program, the declining share of IEA members in global net oil 
imports means it is worth exploring avenues for the participation of the 
major emerging economies in the arrangement, if it is to have any 
ongoing real-world use.40 
 
THIRD STEP: FINE-TUNE THE GLOBAL ENERGY 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 
As valuable as ‘trust-building’ and information-sharing is for healthy 
global governance, the world does ultimately need a forum where the 
major energy players can actually formally negotiate modes of energy 
cooperation on equal terms. The G20’s work on global financial reform 
after the financial crisis was seen by many as a precursor to what the 
                                                                                                       
likely resistance NOC’s in China will have to actively sharing their data with IEA in He 
Xingqiang, “Policy Recommendations” (ibid.).  
37 Shi Xunpeng, “Achieving Concerted National Actions: A Developing Countries 
Perspective on Global Energy Governance under G20” (ibid.). 
38 Michael Levi, “Policy Recommendations” (ibid.). 
39 He Xingqiang, ibid. 
40 Mike Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen, “The G20 and the IEA: Plugging Energy 
Governance Gaps” (ibid.); Ann Florini, “Policy Recommendations” (ibid.); Neil Hirst, 
ibid.; He Xingqiang, ibid. 
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G20 should eventually push for on energy, particularly with respect to 
the G20’s role in transforming the Western-centric Financial Stability 
Forum into the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which now includes all 
G20 economies. As such, tasking G20 energy ministers, the heads of 
the major energy agencies, and other institutions with a significant stake 
in energy policies (such as the World Bank) to work together in exploring 
potential opportunities for future policy cooperation – an ‘Energy Stability 
board’ (ESB) – could be one recommendation G20 leaders make either 
in Brisbane or under the Turkish presidency in 2015.41  
Yet even if the G20 pursues the creation of an ESB-like body, it would 
likely have to draw heavily upon the resources and functions of the IEA 
to support such an endeavour, which points to an expansion of the IEA 
as still being the first-best option for building a stronger energy 
governance system. The political difficulties of bringing about such a 
revision of the IEA cannot be denied, yet it is evident that the agency’s 
future relevance, and the maintenance of its primary position in global 
energy governance, depend upon a more inclusive shift away from the 
status quo. At the very least, the IEA should be encouraged to open an 
‘IEA Association’ office in Asia, with the most logical option being in 
China.42 Realising such goals will require long-term vision and the 
honest commitment of G20 leaders, particularly as the G20 brings 
together the major IEA members and proposed partner countries.  
The recommendations above, and others raised at the SIIS conference, 
may ultimately prove beyond the forum’s capacity, but if the G20 cannot 
at least push global energy reform in the right direction, then it is not 
clear who else can.
                                                
41 Ann Florini, ibid.; Neil Hirst, “Paper for Session on "Global Governance and the G20"” 
(ibid.); He Xingqiang, “Policy Recommendations” (ibid.). 
42 Carin, “Global Energy Governance and the G20”. 
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THE PROSPECTS FOR G20 
ENERGY REFORM: STATES, 
COALITIONS AND CRISES 
CHRISTIAN DOWNIE1 
INTRODUCTION  
At the upcoming G20 Brisbane Summit in November, leaders look set to 
consider reform of the global energy governance architecture. This 
would mark the first time that G20 leaders have actively considered 
whether the existing international energy architecture, largely created in 
response to the oil shocks of the 1970s and dominated by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), is sufficient to meet the rapidly 
changing demands of the global energy sector, a sector which now 
accounts for two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions.2  
The global energy sector is experiencing a transformation. Nations that 
were major energy importers only a few years ago are becoming 
exporters, exporters are becoming large consumers, and previously 
small consumers are now the prime source of global demand for oil and 
gas. China is now the world’s largest energy consumer and is set to 
become the largest oil importing country. India is projected to become 
the largest importer of coal within a decade. And the US, once the 
largest energy consumer, and dependent on Middle Eastern oil, could be 
on track for energy self-sufficiency with the revolution in unconventional 
oil and gas supplies.3 In other words, the global energy sector is no 
longer dominated by a small band of energy-importing OECD countries 
in Europe and North America. Rather, it is quickly being reconfigured by 
the growing demand for energy from non-OECD countries, especially in 
Asia and the Middle East. 
However, these changes are also taking place in a carbon constrained 
world. “As the source of two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions, 
the energy sector will be pivotal in determining whether or not climate 
change goals are achieved”.4 Put simply, the climate problem is an 
energy problem. Yet energy emissions continue to rise and the likelihood 
of reducing global temperatures to 2˚C, the so-called guardrail for 
preventing dangerous climate change, appears the hope of a previous 
                                                
1 Vice Chancellor’s Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, 
University of New South Wales and Visiting Fellow, Regulatory Institutions Network, 
Australian National University. 
2 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013, (Paris, 2013). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 1. 
As the source of two-
thirds of global 
greenhouse gas 
emissions, the energy 
sector will be pivotal in 
determining whether or 
not climate change goals 
are achieved. 
 G20 2014: THE G20 BRISBANE SUMMIT, INEQUALITY, ENERGY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION 
 
38  
 
decade, not this one. If the world does not take action to reduce global 
greenhouse gas emissions it is projected that by the end of the century 
average global temperatures will rise by 5˚C above pre-industrial levels.5 
The international energy architecture has not kept pace with these rapid 
transformations and it is no surprise that there is an emerging consensus 
that a ‘global energy governance gap’ exists. As Florini points out, “the 
current system of global energy governance is a mess, with many 
actors, many priorities, little coherence, and limited effectiveness”.6 Hirst 
and Froggatt argue that “all this points to the need for a genuinely global 
body for cooperation on energy policy including all major energy 
consuming countries and working with energy producers in areas where 
they have interests in common.”7  
While there has been much discussion in the G20 on the potential role of 
the G20 on energy, there is much less on what conditions need to be 
met for the G20 to act in a significant fashion. In other words, to drive 
changes that secure the reliable and affordable supply of energy on the 
one hand, and the transformation to a low carbon energy future on the 
other. If there is a general recognition among G20 countries that such 
reforms are required, why is it not happening on a global scale? What is 
required for the most powerful countries in the world to reform the 
governance system in a significant fashion? This paper takes up this 
task and examines in turn the principal conditions that will need to be 
met, if the G20 is to drive more than piecemeal change. 
  
CONDITIONS FOR G20 ENERGY REFORM 
 
UNILATERAL LEADERSHIP FROM THE UNITED STATES OR 
CHINA 
For most of the twentieth century, the United States has been the most 
powerful state in the world and arguably remains so today. US 
leadership has also been crucial to the success of the G20. Its 
establishment as a leaders’ summit owed much to US coordination, and 
two of the first three summits were hosted in the United States (in 
Washington, DC in 2008 and Pittsburgh in 2009). In addition, it is the 
major donor to most international institutions, including the IEA, the 
                                                
5 Thomas F. Stocker et al., eds., Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013). 
6 “The Peculiar Politics of Energy,” Ethics & International Affairs 26, no. 3 (2012): 303. 
7 “The Reform of Global Energy Governance,” (London, 2012), 10. 
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predominant energy organisation. As a result, should the United States 
decide to take a leadership role on energy in the G20 there is a good 
reason to believe that global energy governance reform can be 
achieved. 
However, while the United States remains a constructive member of the 
G20, under President Obama it has not been inclined to lead. To a large 
extent, this reflects the fact that the United States is able to serve its 
interests in other forums and via other means. For example, the United 
States has been more comfortable using bilateral channels, such as the 
US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, to manage its relationships 
with emerging economies. There is also a general antipathy in the US 
Congress to new multilateral initiatives, evident in recent delays on the 
passage of multilateral trade agreements and a refusal by Congress to 
grant the president fast-track authority to negotiate such agreements. 
That said, the Obama administration has recognised the need to recast 
the existing international energy architecture. For example, in 2009, then 
US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, publicly acknowledged that IEA 
membership should be enlarged to include China and India, and the 
United States has supported the IEA’s association initiative to engage 
the major emerging economies that remain outside the IEA, by virtue of 
the fact that they are not OECD members.8  It is also likely that the 
United States is open to the possibility of a new world energy 
organisation. Yet at the moment it does not view such an institution as 
realistic, nor is it prepared to invest the political capital to drive such a 
reform. Instead, it appears that the preference of the Obama 
administration is to pursue its energy goals bilaterally and within the 
existing international architecture. 
After the United States, China is the only other state that could 
unilaterally drive global energy governance reform through the G20. As 
the world's largest energy consumer and largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases, it is now at the centre of every discussion on global energy 
policy.9 In fact, China and the United States are now the two largest 
energy consumers, the two largest oil consumers, the two largest coal 
producers and consumers, and the two largest carbon emitters.10 As a 
result, in the absence of a US desire to lead the G20, China stands as 
the obvious, and likely the only alternative state that could drive reform. 
 
                                                
8 Ann Florini and Benjamin K. Sovacool, “Who Governs Energy? The Challenges 
Facing Global Energy Governance,” Energy Policy 37, no. 12 (2009): 5243. 
9 Bo Kong, “Governing China’s Energy in the Context of Global Governance,” Global 
Policy 2, no. S1 (2011): 51-65. 
10 Mikkal Herberg, “China's ‘Energy Rise’, the U.S. and the New Geopolitics of Energy,” 
(Los Angeles, 2010): 5 
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China has used the G20 to question other areas of global governance, 
such as the governance of the IMF and the World Bank following the 
global financial crisis. And China has expressed concern about the 
fragmented nature of the current international energy architecture and 
has supported moves to reform existing institutions. China was one of 
six countries in 2013 to issue a joint statement with the IEA supporting 
the association initiative. Yet even with this initiative China will not be a 
member of the IEA, and it is hard to believe that it will be willing to accept 
the rules and norms of a system in the long term without having a voice 
in how it is run. In short, there are reasons to expect that China could be 
motivated to drive substantive global energy governance reform. 
Yet China so far seems to have accepted the existing international order. 
Although China has clearly become more active in multilateral forums, it 
has not been inclined to take a leadership role and advocate new 
institutions or globalise regulations. As others have pointed out, China 
may appear more confident on the international stage, but this only goes 
so far.11 While it is certainly more comfortable in the G20 as it never was 
in the G8+5 process, Chinese leaders have continued to argue in 
multilateral settings that China is a developing country “and cannot take 
on a level of obligation that goes beyond its capacity”.12 
Further, and equally importantly, China, much like the United States, 
appears to have no clear preference or vision for a future multilateral 
energy architecture. It is turning to bilateral and regional channels to 
secure its energy objectives. It has used bilateral dialogues with the 
United States and Japan to manage energy issues and its national oil 
companies are active in over 30 countries, where they have signed long-
term contracts to secure oil and gas supplies.13 China has also used the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to promote regional energy 
cooperation, which it founded in 2001, and whose members include 
Russia and Kazakhstan. 
 
COALITION LEADERSHIP FROM THE BRICS 
In the absence of a powerful state providing unilateral leadership, reform 
could come from a coalition of states. In multilateral forums, coalitions 
that defend a common position by explicit coordination can provide a 
powerful force to direct negotiations toward their preferred outcome. In 
the context of the G20, the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
                                                
11 Zhiqun Zhu, China's New Diplomacy: Rational Strategies and Significance  (Farnham: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 1; Kong, “Governing China’s Energy in the Context of Global 
Governance.” 
12 Jiechi cited in Zhu, China's New Diplomacy: Rational Strategies and Significance, 
236. 
13 Herberg, “China's ‘Energy Rise’, the U.S. and the New Geopolitics of Energy.” 
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South Africa – are the most likely coalition to drive energy reform, not 
simply because of their growing economic power, but because the 
transformations in their economies are driving the rapid transformation of 
global energy markets and at the same time they are excluded from the 
principal international energy organisation, the IEA.   
However, the behaviour of the BRICS coalition suggests they are 
unlikely to drive substantive global energy governance reform in the near 
term. First and foremost, they have used their rising economic power to 
act as a veto coalition, to obstruct initiatives they do not support, rather 
than to drive reforms they do. The BRICS have questioned the 
legitimacy of the existing global order, but they have not sought to 
transform it. As has been documented elsewhere, the BRICS used the 
global financial crisis in 2008 and their temporarily increased bargaining 
power, due to their relative economic stability, to question the legitimacy 
of the global financial institutions, namely of the IMF and World Bank.14 
And, in return for agreeing to provide increased financial resources to the 
IMF, BRICS countries were able to force the G20 to undertake a series 
of quota and governance reforms of the IMF to increase their voting 
power. Yet even when the latest of these reforms is implemented, the 
so-called 2010 governance reforms, the United States will still hold a 
voting share of 16.5 per cent (compared to 6 per cent for China and just 
over 2 per cent for Russia, India and Brazil); enough to veto any IMF 
decision.15 
Second, the BRICS do not have a clear preference or vision for a future 
international architecture, be it for finance or energy. In the case of 
finance, they are quick to chastise the United States or the EU on 
economic and non-economic issues in G20 meetings, notably the United 
States’ failure to ratify the 2010 IMF governance reforms, but they are 
less eager to put forward constructive alternatives that they are united 
behind.16 It is the same on energy. For instance, the BRICS have 
supported the IEA’s association initiative and its outreach to other energy 
bodies, such as the IEF, but they have not articulated a vision for a 
future system of energy governance. In short, the BRICS have been 
able to force piecemeal changes to the existing order, but they have not 
been willing or able to drive global governance reform in a significant 
                                                
14 Oliver Stuenkel, “The Financial Crisis, Contested Legitimacy, and the Genesis of 
Intra-BRICS Cooperation,” Global Governance 19, no.  4 (2013); Peter Drahos, 
“Regulatory Capitalism, Globalization and the End of History,” Intellectual Property Law 
and Policy Journal Forthcoming, (2014). 
15 IMF, “Quota and Voting Shares before and after Implementation of Reforms Agreed 
in 2008 and 2010,” (2011), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pdfs/quota_tbl.pdf.  
16 G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014,” (Sydney, 23 February 2014), 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-0223-finance.html. 
…the BRICS do not have 
a clear preference or 
vision for a future 
international architecture, 
be it for finance or 
energy. 
 G20 2014: THE G20 BRISBANE SUMMIT, INEQUALITY, ENERGY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION 
 
42  
 
fashion. In other words, they have resisted the type of leadership that 
has characterised US behaviour in this arena.17 
 
CRISES 
Given the existing preferences of the United States, China and the 
BRICS, it is likely that substantive reform will require something to 
change, some form of crisis to shift behaviour. 
Major crises have the potential to transform the context in which G20 
negotiations on energy take place. Others have noted the role that crises 
can play in shifting state behaviour.18 The most common pathway is 
where a dramatic event, or series of events, captures the imagination of 
mass publics, after media organisations dramatise the event, and state 
actors are forced to act to placate the public and the media.19 The 
Bhopal accident in 1984 and Chernobyl accident in 1986 are classic 
cases of events that catalysed mass public reactions and forced states 
to act both domestically and internationally. 
Exogenous shocks are not new to the G20. After all, the G20’s 
legitimacy has largely been determined by its success as a crisis 
committee, particularly following the global financial crisis. Without a 
crystal ball it is difficult to know whether an energy crisis is on the 
horizon, but it is not hard to imagine a scenario. After all, the IEA was 
only established in response to the oil shocks of the 1970s, and given 
the current demands on global energy markets from a new cast of 
consumers and producers, it is only a matter of time before a shortfall of 
energy in a major consuming nation, such as China following a 
disruption to oil trade routes, or Europe following a crisis with Russia, or 
the United States following another hurricane Katrina, sparks a response 
from the G20. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Without the unilateral leadership of the United States or China, or 
leadership from a coalition of states, most likely the BRICS, which is 
mobilised by a crisis that shifts the behaviour of these actors, it is difficult 
                                                
17 Drahos, “Regulatory Capitalism, Globalization and the End of History”, 14. 
18 William Zartman, “Negotiating the Rapids: The Dynamics of Regime Formation,” in 
Getting It Done: Postagreement Negotiation and International Regimes, ed. Bertram 
Spector and William Zartman (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2003). 
19 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Anthony Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology - the 
"Issue-Attention Cycle",” Public Interest 28, Summer (1972). 
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to envisage the conditions under which substantive global energy 
governance reform will occur. Instead, what we are likely to witness in 
the energy arena are piecemeal changes to the existing order, such as 
the IEA association initiative, rather than an attempt to transform the 
existing international energy architecture to match the transformations in 
global energy markets.
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BEYOND THE CURRENT G20 
ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENDA: 
BUILDING INTEGRITY, NOT 
JUST FIGHTING CORRUPTION 
CHARLES SAMPFORD1 
Corruption was once seen as a viable development option (bribing the 
Colonel provided predictability for investors). Corruption is now 
recognised as a ‘fast road to a dead end’. This wide recognition has led 
to many good ideas for combating corruption – possibly too many good 
ideas to pursue in isolation.  
While countries are encouraged to develop national corruption plans, 
these can often appear as a list of actions comprising separate legal, 
institutional, economic and ethical measures rather than a highly 
coordinated multi-path strategy of mutually reinforcing measures. But 
even the strongest anti-corruption programs suffer a flaw. Governance 
goals cannot be reduced to negatives like combating corruption. If 
corruption is seen as the “abuse of entrusted power for the personal 
benefit or party political gain” it is necessary to know what the ‘correct’ 
use is. This leads us to the more central concept of integrity (‘the use of 
entrusted power for publicly justified and officially endorsed purposes’).2 
The point of government is not merely to avoid the abuse of entrusted 
governmental power – a goal that could be achieved much more 
thoroughly by eliminating government. The point of concentrating 
people, power and resources in our institutions is to further the interests 
of the public even though this generates the risk of corruption. 
Accordingly, governance systems need to be designed to maximise 
integrity and minimise corruption, maladministration, and other failures of 
integrity.  
While anti-corruption agencies are an important part of such governance 
systems, they can only be a means for protecting integrity as advanced 
by other institutions in which the competition over the publicly justified 
and officially endorsed uses of government power are resolved and 
those uses pursued. The promotion of integrity and combating corruption 
requires a set of integrity institutions, backed by legal, ethical, and 
economic measures, mutually supporting each other when they are 
fulfilling their role and mutually checking when they do not.  
                                                
1 Director, IEGL, The Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law, (a joint initiative of the 
United Nations University, Griffith, QUT, ANU, Center for Asian Integrity in Manila and 
OP Jindal Global University, Delhi), President, International Institute for Public Ethics. 
2 “the abuse of…” definition is utilised by Transparency International and has gained 
widespread acceptance. 
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This combination of measures was given various names – ‘ethics 
regimes’, ‘ethics infrastructure’ then ‘national integrity system’ – of which 
the last has enjoyed the widest currency.3 Interestingly, given the 
location of the 2014 G20 Summit, all of them were inspired by the root 
and branch reform process followed by Queensland in the early 1990s.4 
A number of methodologies have been developed for assessing and 
analysing integrity systems, including two by Transparency International 
(TI) in conjunction with researchers. These methodologies offer the 
possibility of integrating legal, ethical, institutional and economic means 
for promoting integrity and combating corruption. However, many anti-
corruption efforts are not informed by such approaches and remain 
mired in a long list of measures, good in themselves, but not integrated. 
 
TWO ‘NEW’ PROBLEMS 
Many of the integrity issues G20 countries face are not confined to single 
countries. The G20 became a leaders’ meeting because of problems 
within the global financial ‘system’. Addressing this first challenge 
requires mapping, analysing, assessing, and improving sectoral integrity 
systems at a global level – starting with global finance (a ‘Global 
Financial Integrity System to deal with future ‘global financial crises’) 
and, the IEGL would suggest, moving on to global carbon control (a 
‘Global Carbon Integrity System’) to ensure integrity in whatever 
emerges from the UNFCCC meeting in Paris in 2015.  
The second challenge was recognised by a head of the Italian ‘clean 
hands’ campaign who pointed out that, in many countries, there are 
‘corruption systems’ which possess all of the characteristics you would 
want to find in a national integrity system – clear values, strong 
institutions linked by long-term and effective relationships, valuable 
incentives and very strong sanctions. Indeed, in many countries, the 
national corruption system is much more effective than the integrity 
system, not least because of constant attempts by the former to disrupt 
the latter. Integrity institutions need to recognise that they are generally 
                                                
3 Charles Sampford, “Law, Institutions and the Public Private Divide, Alta Keynote,” 
Federal Law Review 185 (1992); OECD, “Ethics in the Public Sector: Current Issues 
and Practices,” (Paris, 1996); Petter Langseth, Rick Stapenhurst, and Jeremy Pope, 
“The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting Corruption,” Commonwealth Law 
Bulletin 23 (1997). 
4 In the late 1980s, a Commission of Inquiry revealed widespread corruption throughout 
the government of the state of Queensland, and the Queensland police force. The 630-
page report that stemmed from what is now known as The Fitzgerald Inquiry (named for 
Tony Fitzgerald QC, who led the inquiry) made over 100 recommendations to combat 
corruption throughout Queensland. For more, see: Queensland Crime and Corruption 
Commission. "The Fitzgerald Inquiry."  https://www.ccc.qld.gov.au/about-the-ccc/the-
fitzgerald-inquiry.  
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not just dealing with corrupt individuals and organisations but also 
corruption systems. 
Accordingly, G20 countries need to understand, map, assess, and 
analyse the corruption systems that operate within and across these 
borders. This could be done by the development of existing work on 
corruption system assessment and corruption network research. To this 
end, G20 countries also need to look at various attempts to disrupt, 
expose, and destroy corruption systems so that those afflicted by them 
can progress. G20 countries should also describe and analyse the 
various means for tackling large-scale corruption based on previous 
successes and failures. 
  
FROM NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS TO GLOBAL 
INTEGRITY SYSTEMS 
For the last two decades, the primary focus of corruption studies and 
anti-corruption activism has been corruption within sovereign states. 
International activism was largely directed at coordinating national 
campaigns and to using international instruments to make them more 
effective domestically. This reflects the broader fact that, since the rise of 
the nation state, states have comprised most of the largest institutional 
actors and have been the most significant institution in the lives of most 
individuals. This made states the ‘main game in town’ for the 
‘governance disciplines’ – lawyers, political scientists, economists, and 
ethicists.  
Over the last twenty-five years, the flow of money, goods, people, and 
ideas across borders has threatened to overwhelm the system of 
sovereign states. Much activity has moved outside the control of nation 
states at the same time as nation states have ‘deregulated’. In so doing, 
states have transferred power from those exercising governmental 
power at the nominal behest of the majority of its citizens to those with 
greater wealth and/or greater knowledge in markets in which knowledge 
is often asymmetric.  
It is now recognised that many governance problems have arisen 
because of globalisation and can only be addressed by global solutions. 
It must also be recognised that governance problems at the national 
level contribute to governance problems at the global level and vice 
versa. This is true of current issues from the melting Greenland glaciers 
to a series of ethical and financial meltdowns – the global financial crisis’ 
(GFC) and the ‘global carbon crisis’ (GCC). It is also true of traditional 
issues involving interlinked domestic and international conflict and the 
toxic symbiosis of foreigners paying bribes to officials. This has led to 
inappropriate infrastructure decisions, stunted development in which the 
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unearned profits are shifted, sifted and deposited in tax havens – items 
on the G20 agenda.  
TI commissioned me to do an overview paper for the 2008 Athens 
International Anti-Corruption Conference titled From National Integrity 
Systems to Global Integrity Systems.5 In that paper, I outlined how the 
application of an integrity systems approach might be applied to the GFC 
and GCC and other global sectoral problems. Since then, we at the 
IEGL have been working on the development of that methodology 
through a series of papers and projects.6  
 
The key elements of the Global Financial Integrity System include: 
• Global governance: strengthening the G20, mobilising the UN and its 
‘unique legitimacy’, international treaties and other arrangements 
such as the Global Compact and the Basel Accords.  
• Regional governance: working with the European Central Bank and 
regional development banks such as the Asian Development Bank.  
• National and sub-national governance: these levels of governance 
must be brought on board, as they are where most banking, 
competition and financial regulation are managed.  
• Professional governance: existing professions such as law and 
accounting must ensure that their services are not used to defraud 
and add risk. The professionalisation of finance along traditional 
professional lines would help enormously.  
• Corporate governance: many key players in this space have weak 
integrity processes that could certainly be improved.  
 
                                                
5 Charles Sampford, “Global Transparency: Fighting Corruption for a Sustainable 
Future” (paper presented at the 13th International Anti-Corruption Conference: from 
National Integrity Systems to Global Integrity Systems, Athens, 30 October to 2 
November 2008), http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/246206/IACC-
conference-discussion-paper.pdf. 
6 “Adam Smith's Dinner,” in The Future of Financial Regulation, ed. Iain Macneil and 
Justin  
O'Brien (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010); Project wise, see: Charles Sampford, Ramesh 
Thakur,  
Rowena Maguire, Douglas Fisher, Hugh Breakey, and Timothy Cadman. "ARC 
Discovery Project,  
Towards Carbon Integrity: Applying Integrity Systems Methodology to the ‘Global 
Carbon Crisis’." 
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CORRUPTION SYSTEMS: A NEW VARIABLE 
While ‘ethics regimes’, ‘ethics infrastructures’ and ‘national integrity 
systems’ were seen to be the answer to corruption, TI’s early 
comparative studies generated some surprising results.7 Although 
countries with stronger national integrity systems were generally less 
corrupt than those with weak national integrity systems, the correlation 
was not as great as it might be imagined. Some countries with very low 
levels of corruption seemed to lack institutions that TI’s model of a 
national integrity system needed. Some highly corrupt countries 
appeared to have all the elements of the TI model – and some new 
ideas and improvements of their own that should have made their 
integrity systems even more effective.  
The answer was hinted by Gerardo Colombo, a leader of the Clean 
Hands campaign, at the IEGL’s launch of the National Integrity Systems 
Assessment (NISA) in late 2004. He thought that the work the IEGL had 
done was very good and there should be more of it. But he said the 
IEGL should pay at least as much attention to what he called ‘national 
corruption systems’. He pointed out that they often had what integrity 
systems needed but frequently lacked – strong institutions, long-standing 
relationships, clear norms, strong incentives, and sanctions that were not 
only very strong but very likely to be inflicted.  
The strength of a national integrity system is not the only relevant 
variable in determining the level of corruption. The more significant 
variable is the strength of the ‘national corruption system’ (NCS) – which 
is, in many states, better organised, resourced, and more effective than 
the NIS. This may explain why some states with apparently limited 
‘integrity systems’ are relatively free from corruption and some states 
with apparently extensive ‘integrity systems’ remain highly corrupt. While 
a NIS may be seen as the best way to promote integrity, the corrupt are 
often far more organised – with long-established patterns of behaviour, 
strong institutions, clear norms and effective positive and negative 
sanctions. The NCS will seek to disrupt and corrupt the NIS. As a 
corollary, the NIS should not merely seek to deter, detect and prosecute 
bribe givers and bribe takers but should first set to map and understand 
the corruption system then plan how to disrupt and destroy it.  
 
                                                
7 See Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor, “The National Integrity System: Assessing 
Corruption and Reform,” Public Administration and Development 23, no. 4 (2003). This 
article built on a Transparency International (TI)-sponsored research study funded by 
the Dutch Government into the National Integrity System (NIS) in practice. 
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CORRUPTION SYSTEMS RESEARCH: THE NEXT 
MAJOR FIELD OF CORRUPTION/INTEGRITY 
RESEARCH? 
Gerardo’s comments suggest what may be the next major field of 
corruption/integrity research, capacity building and action. The IEGL has 
been scoping and trialling corruption systems mapping work in the 
Philippines with three workshops funded from a variety of sources. Many 
now believe that this is the ‘next big thing’ in anti-corruption work (just as 
integrity systems were in the late 1990s).  
 
REVISITING FITZGERALD – AN OBJECT LESSON IN 
THE DESTRUCTION OF A CORRUPTION SYSTEM 
Long before the integrity reforms were enacted, Queensland’s corruption 
system had been effectively destroyed by the Fitzgerald Inquiry.8 The 
exposure was so complete that the corruption system operating within 
the state was effectively destroyed and could no longer function in its 
previous form. In the beginning, the Inquiry probed allegations of police 
misconduct and activities but eventually expanded to become a wide-
ranging investigation into the entire institutional framework of the State.  
The methodology was instructive. Judicious grants of immunity were 
given to those who were prepared to disclose their activities. While 
immunities allowed certain witnesses to escape prosecution, without 
indemnities it is unlikely that evidence would have become public. The 
Inquiry encouraged the ‘small fish’ to disclose in return for immunity and 
then worked up the hierarchy until the whole picture was exposed. At a 
certain point, it was announced that the Inquiry was interested in hearing 
from those who could tell them something they did not already know – 
and could offer immunity from prosecution.  
Such strategies are not new. The key to success is to set incentives so 
that it will be in the perceived best interests of most members of the 
corruption system to disclose to preserve their interests. If those 
incentives are set correctly, sufficient numbers will volunteer information 
and the rest will have an incentive to do so because of the likelihood of 
exposure. This outcome was the experience of the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
approach.  
 
                                                
8 See footnote 4. 
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THREE WAYS TO DESTROY A NATIONAL 
CORRUPTION SYSTEM 
There are many powerful opponents of reform. In order to cause a mass 
exodus from an entrenched corruption system, a seminal event or 
defining process is needed to alter expectations and incentives that are 
sufficient to encourage significant numbers of individuals to desert the 
corruption system and assist the integrity system in exposing and 
destroying it.  
 
SEQUENTIAL INVESTIGATION WITH IMMUNITY 
The Fitzgerald model operated under a system of sequential 
investigation and offered general immunity as part of a public inquiry. 
The visibility of the hearings made them a powerful form of public 
disgrace for indemnity applicants that in important ways mimicked the 
exposure of a criminal trial. However, the real goal is to expose the ‘big 
fish’ and help the public and prosecutors understand what the corruption 
system is and how it works, so the latter can set about dismantling it.  
 
AMNESTIES 
An amnesty for corruption related offences would offer a much broader 
remedy in which all those who admit to their part in corruption are given 
immunity from prosecution, and depending on the extent of their 
corruption and their position, they may even keep their jobs or some of 
the ill-gotten gains. However, the terms of the amnesty should not 
merely involve forgiveness for any corruption admitted. It should be 
based on the principle that full immunity is given if there is full disclosure. 
Failure to declare all means that no immunity is provided. Selective 
reporting of corruption is not acceptable.  
An extra incentive to disclose could be in allowing those who disclose to 
keep a proportion of the proceeds of the corruption and to receive a 
proportion of the proceeds of corruption of others which is proven.  
 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS (TRCS) 
TRCs are one important element in the growing transnational 
institutional apparatus behind international human rights and 
humanitarian law. They could play a similar role where corruption has 
been entrenched. TRCs can identify far more perpetrators than 
investigations and prosecutions would uncover. They allow for a more 
public and systematic account of corruption in a jurisdiction than an 
amnesty, and allow for further investigation beyond merely a receipt of 
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the information under an amnesty. TRCs can be very useful and 
potentially transformative where there is a practice or collective 
experience that most want to put behind them. It allows national 
recognition of a form of wrongdoing and a national decision to move on 
from it – with perpetrators admitting wrongdoing individually and 
collectively seeking forgiveness from victims individually and collectively.  
As with the version of amnesty suggested, full disclosure should be 
required to secure immunity. However, it is also useful to operate on the 
principle that the first to report obtain more favourable treatment.9 This 
would avoid creating an incentive to hang back and see what else 
comes out.  
 
GENERALISING THE METHODOLOGY – THE 
PRISONER’S DILEMMA WRIT LARGE 
All three methods are based on an exchange between the individually 
corrupt and the state (and its citizens). The individuals have information 
that the state wants – knowledge of individual corruption and of how the 
corruption system operates. The state has the capacity to grant immunity 
and, with it, liberty. The individuals also have something that they would 
like to retain and which the state would like returned – the proceeds of 
corruption. One of the central goals of all three methods of combating 
corruption systems is to achieve an exchange of information for retained 
freedom.  
Amnesties and TRCs can build on the fact that corruption almost 
universally requires more than one person. The state should try to create 
a set of incentives and disincentives so that, in the corrupt individual’s 
mind, disclosure benefits them, no matter what their accomplices do, 
while silence benefits the others no matter what that player does. The 
state should seek to create something analogous to the prisoner’s 
dilemma – without the dilemma.  
If the majority of those involved (generally ‘small fish’) will keep most of 
the assets and lifestyle they have and are not likely to be killed for such 
revelations, then it is in their economic interests to disclose. Failure to do 
so would cost liberty, assets, and lifestyle. Silence achieves little if 
                                                
9 A system could exist where a sliding scale operates so that a witness before such a 
commission may get to keep some of the proceeds of corruption depending on whether 
they were a ‘small fish’ or a ‘big fish’ in the corruption system. For clean individuals who 
report what others have done, a reward system could apply. In the case of wrongdoers, 
future unlawful activity will produce full prosecution for previously admitted corruption 
and any future corruption. 
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everyone else involved is silent too but is catastrophic if at least one 
other person discloses.  
The ‘bigger fish’ will have to disgorge some of their gains but still retain 
enough to maintain a more modest but desirable lifestyle. Only one of 
the people with whom they had corrupt dealings need to disclose for the 
‘bigger fish’ to lose everything. 
The systemic benefits of identifying and stopping corruption make 
generosity worthwhile. If the incentives are structured so that rational 
people would be expected to choose the path of disclosure then it 
operates at two levels, as a ‘double reason for action’. The favourable 
balance of incentives and disincentives mean that an individual is likely 
to disclose. The fact that he or she knows that it is in the interests of 
others who were involved in their corruption and know of their 
involvement, gives a further reason to divulge their actions. This is what 
generates such a powerful incentive to disclose and would make a 
corruption TRC so much more effective.  
 
WHY SHOULD THIS BE A PRIORITY FOR THE G20? 
Many of the problems the G20 confronts are not strictly a matter of 
corruption but of a lack of ethics and integrity. Many see the global 
financial crisis (the ‘great recession’ to others) as at least partly caused 
by serious failings in the ethics and integrity of bankers, ratings agencies 
and the professional lawyers, accountants and auditors who worked for 
them. The same can be said of the LIBOR currency manipulation 
scandal. In other areas of the G20 agenda, integrity is critical and 
failures of integrity are not essentially a matter of corruption – including 
financial regulation, BEPS and infrastructure.  
 
WHAT SHOULD THE G20 DO? 
The Brisbane Leaders’ Declaration should emphasise the importance of 
promoting integrity as well as combating corruption and encourage 
developing integrity systems and understanding their opposite 
(corruption systems).  
Rename the ACWG the IACWG – integrity and anti-corruption working 
group, giving it new impetus. The IACWG would take a coordinating and 
leadership role in developing integrity and corruption systems 
assessments.  
The G20 Action Plan 2015-2016 should commit to extending the ACWG 
(preferably renamed IACWG) and including integrity and corruptions 
systems assessments at the national and global level in its work plan.  
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The G20 should urge its members to encourage their integrity agencies, 
professions and academics to collaborate in integrity and corruption 
systems research within and across their borders. 
The G20 should encourage research funding bodies within its member 
states to recognise this work among their priorities. 
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